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A Rose by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet (or
Would It?)∗: Filing and Searching in
Article 9’s Public Records
Margit Livingston∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourteenth century concept of parsimony known as Occam’s
Razor states, “Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.”1 This
idea of simplicity—of stripping away the nonessential—has informed
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code from its inception. Among
the great beauties of Article 9 is its simplification of the requirements for
giving notice to third parties of security interests in personal property or
fixtures.2 Before Article 9, personal property secured transactions were
governed by a myriad of state laws.3 Many of these laws required

∗ In her famous balcony scene, Juliet pines for her lover, Romeo, whose relatives are
enemies of her own: “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose / By any other word would smell
as sweet.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
∗∗ Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the most capable research efforts of DePaul law students Brian Hanlon, Timothy J.
Mullens, and Cherie Travis, whose dedicated work was vitally important in the creation of this
article.
1. Philosopher William of Occam developed this principle, the Latin version of which is
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate. Phil Gibbs & Sugihara Hiroshi, What is Occam’s
Razor?, http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
2. One commentator described this simplification of the older personal property security
law:
Article 9 . . . is considered by many to be the signal achievement of the Code.
Taking the confused state of prior law relating to chattel mortgages and conditional sales,
the Reporters reduced to black letter principles a Code which permitted easy and
effective financing secured by accounts receivable and chattels, including inventories.
Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The Progressive
Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 374 (1983).
3. Grant Gilmore, one of the principal drafters of Article 9, recounted the drafting
committee’s high expectations regarding the unifying and simplifying effect of Article 9 on secured
transactions law:
Pre-Code personal property security law may be described as closely resembling that
obscure wood in which Dante discovered the gates of hell. We thought that, with a little
pruning and clearing, we could turn the obscure wood into a people’s park where widows
and orphans and country bankers could enjoy their innocent pleasures, safe from the
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secured parties to give notice of their interests through extensive and
detailed public filings that the courts subjected to hypercritical scrutiny.4
Minor errors on the public documents caused judicial nullification of the
filing and resulted in loss of perfection, subordination, and bankruptcy
destruction of the security interest.
The original Article 9 Reporters sought to simplify the notice
requirements and developed the concept of notice filing. Rather than
demanding that lenders file complicated documents filled out with
exacting precision, Article 9 only required certain basic pieces of
information in the publicly recorded financing statement. The goal of
filing was merely to put third parties on notice that security interests
might exist as opposed to providing detailed information about the nature
and extent of the secured party’s financing arrangement with the debtor.
It was then up to interested third parties to seek out further information
from the debtor, the secured party, or another source.
Along with the adoption of notice filing came the doctrine of
substantial compliance. If a financing statement substantially complied
with Article 9, it was valid “even though it contain[ed] minor errors
which are not seriously misleading.”5 The drafters adopted the position
that absolute precision on a financing statement was not necessary. As
long as third parties were receiving sufficient information to engage in
further inquiry, the public filing system was fulfilling its function.6
attack of ravening wild beasts and trustees in bankruptcy. The sad truth is that personal
property security law is well on the way to becoming quite as fragmented and quite as
complex as it ever was in the bad old days before the Code.
Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a
Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981).
4. Professor Karl Llewellyn, in an early article on the codification of security law, noted the
considerable disadvantages created by the helter-skelter collection of pre-Code statutes and case law
governing security devices: “What is not minor is the price in complexity, inconvenience, and often
in unfairness which must be paid when legal patterns of happenstance origin are taken in all their
history-ridden detail as the basis for the doing of remodeling jobs which are themselves piece-work.”
Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687, 688
(1948).
5. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1995). Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to Article 9 will be to
Revised Article 9, which was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1999 and has been adopted by all fifty states, the Virgin Islands, and the
District of Columbia. Revised Article 9 has an effective date of July 1, 2001, in almost all states.
References to prior versions of Article 9 will indicate the year of that particular version in
parentheses. The phrase “pre-revision Article 9” refers to the 1972 version of Article 9, as amended,
which was in effect in all states until Revised Article 9 became effective in 2001.
6. Filing a financing statement was and remains the chief method by which secured parties
achieve perfection of their security interests. As will be discussed in more detail later, perfection
leads to essential benefits for secured parties—namely, priority over other claimants to the same
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In the 1990s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) decided to
overhaul Article 9 in an attempt to further modernize and simplify the
law governing secured transactions.7 The end product of their efforts was
Revised Article 9, which was adopted by all fifty states (with an effective
date of July 1, 2001, in most states).8 Revised Article 9 retained, with a
small modification in wording, the substantial compliance standard
regarding the sufficiency of financing statements.9 The new law,
however, carved out an exception to the substantial compliance doctrine
for the debtor’s name on the financing statement.10 While new Article 9
as a whole has not generated much cutting-edge litigation in the five
years since its adoption, the issue of the debtor’s name on the financing
statement has produced significant and sometimes conflicting case law.
This Article will examine the debtor-name issue as it developed
under prior law and is developing under the new version of Article 9.11
property of the debtor and survival of the security interest in the event of the debtor’s bankruptcy.
Although Revised Article 9 provides for other methods of perfections for certain types of collateral,
such as possession or control of the collateral by the secured party, filing of a financing statement is
still the primary method of perfection. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2001) (“Except as otherwise provided
in subsection (b) and Section 9-312(b), a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security
interests and agricultural liens.”).
7. Article 9 is the joint product of the ALI and NCCUSL. See generally Steven O. Weise,
An Overview of Revised UCC Article 9, in THE NEW ARTICLE 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1
(Corinne Cooper ed., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE NEW ARTICLE 9]. The ALI and NCCUSL
appointed a study committee in 1990 to assess Article 9 and recommend possible revisions. See
generally Edwin E. Smith, An Introduction to Revised UCC Article 9 (1999), in THE NEW ARTICLE
9, supra, at 17. In its final 1992 report, the Study Group recommended changes to Article 9 that
would increase its scope, simplify perfection, and clarify enforcement rules. PERMANENT EDITORIAL
BD. FOR THE UCC, PEB STUDY GROUP: REPORT ON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9, at
10–11 (1992) [hereinafter UCC REPORT].
8. Only four states adopted a non-uniform effective date: Connecticut, Alabama, Florida,
and Mississippi. ALA. CODE § 7-9A-701 (2005) (adopting Revised Article 9 on January 1, 2002);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-702 (2006) (adopting Revised Article 9 on October 1, 2001); FLA. STAT.
§ 679.701 (2006) (adopting Revised Article 9 on January 1, 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-701
(2006) (same).
9. Revised U.C.C. § 9-506(a) provides that “[a] financing statement substantially satisfying
the requirements of this part is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or
omissions make the financing statement seriously misleading.” Thus, Revised Article 9 seemingly
emphasizes that the grievousness of the errors is to be judged by whether they render the financing
statement as a whole seriously misleading as opposed to whether the errors themselves in isolation
might be regarded as misleading.
10. See U.C.C. § 9-506(b)–(c) (setting forth a strict rule regarding the accuracy of the
debtor’s name); see also infra text accompanying notes 59–65.
11. A number of scholars have tackled the problem of the debtor’s name on a financing
statement over the years. See, e.g., Todd D. Penney, Article 9 Financing Statement Searches: Is a
Rose by Any Other Name Still a Rose?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415 (1990); Paul J. Ricotta & Adrienne K.
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This Article explores the issue from the perspective of allocating burdens
appropriately between filing parties and searching parties and concludes
that while the case lawinterpreting former Article 9 put too much of the
burden of debtor-name errors on the searching party, courts applying
Revised Article 9 have gone too far the other way in invalidating
financing statements that contain extremely small errors. Granted, in
most cases, the filing party can reduce the overall costs of the filing
system by assuring the accuracy of the debtor’s name ex ante at the time
of the initial filing. However, assuring accuracy in the debtor’s name is
sometimes more easily said than done, particularly where a debtor has
more than one name and even more than one “legal” name. Hence, this
Article suggests that Article 9 should be amended to clarify that, as most
courts have assumed, the debtor’s legal name is required on the financing
statement, regardless of the debtor’s status as an individual, registered
organization, unregistered organization, or other type of entity. Article 9,
however, should provide a safe harbor to filers attempting to ascertain
the debtor’s legal name. Furthermore, this Article argues that the
computer search logic employed by the secretary of state offices for their
Article 9 records should be refined to assist searchers in finding
financing statements that contain minor errors in the debtor’s name.
Part II of this Article reviews the law regarding the debtor-name
issue under prior versions of Article 9. Part III examines the changes
wrought by Revised Article 9. Part IV summarizes recent developments
in the case lawin this area, and Part V advances a proposal for further
modification of the statute to clarify which of multiple debtor names
should be used on financing statements and to mandate refinement of
computerized searching techniques to assure greater accuracy of the
filing system and to reduce future litigation.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND SOME HISTORY
A. Historical Treatment of Security Interests
In the early nineteenth century when creditors first began to use
widely nonpossessory security devices involving debtors’ personal

Walker, What’s in a Name? (Apparently, a Lot), 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2005, at 26; Julianna
Zekan, The Name Game—Playing To Win Under § 9-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 265 (1990).
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property, the courts reacted with suspicion and hostility.12 Whereas real
estate liens required some sort of public notice to be effective,13 there
was initially no similar mechanism for giving notice of nonpossessory
security interests in personal property. Courts had an instinctive
abhorrence for these so-called secret liens—privately created security
interests in favor of a particular lender that were hidden from view
because the debtor retained possession of the encumbered property.14
The only antecedent for personal property security devices—the ancient
practice of pawning or pledging one’s goods—did not present the same
problem of secrecy. Because the debtor had to surrender physical
possession of the goods to the pawnbroker, that action by itself put third
parties on alert that the debtor had already given an interest in its
property to someone else.15
Legislatures reacted to judicial nullification of security interests by
passing a number of statutes that required secured lenders to file a
document in the public records or otherwise to give effective notice to
the world of their interests.16 These statutes took a variety of forms and
were tailored to specific types of secured transactions, such as accounts
factoring, conditional sales, chattel mortgages, and trust receipt
arrangements.17 But despite ongoing developments, the law always
remained a step or two behind commercial lending practices.18 As
12. This hostility is evident as far back as the early seventeenth century in England. In 1601,
the Star Chamber convicted a debtor of making a fraudulent conveyance where he retained
possession of goods after purporting to make a “general deed of gift” to a creditor. Twyne’s Case,
(1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber).
13. See, e.g., CONN. STAT. tit. 56, ch. 1, § 9 (1821) (requiring recordation in town where land
lies); Dana v. Newhall, 13 Mass. (1 Tyng) 498, 501 (1816) (referring to the legal necessity of
recording transfers of land in the public records).
14. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 180 (1983) (“Separation of ownership
and possession has been viewed as a source of mischief toward third parties and, for that reason, as
fraudulent.”).
15. See id. at 181 & n.24. One scholar, however, has disputed the widely accepted notion that
before the advent of the chattel mortgage acts in the nineteenth century, nonpossessory security
interests in personal property were unenforceable as fraudulent conveyances. See George Lee Flint,
Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M. L. REV. 363, 366 (1999) (stating
that pre-nineteenth century “opinions reveal many courts enforcing the nonpossessory secured
transaction against third parties prior to the passage of the respective chattel mortgage act”).
16. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.1 (1965).
17. See Homer Kripke, Some Reflections After a Quarter-Century of the Uniform
Commercial Code and on the Inception of a New Bankruptcy Code, 87 COM. L.J. 124, 125–26
(1982).
18. Article 9 drafter Grant Gilmore noted that the industrial revolution created the “demand
that all types of personal property be made available as security even though, because of the nature
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creditors developed different security devices to compensate for the legal
vacuum, legislatures responded by validating such devices but imposing
certain restrictions on them designed to protect other creditors and third
parties. One of the difficulties that lenders faced under these new
statutory regimes was that each type of security device had its own legal
requirements, and even the legal requirements for each particular type of
transaction could vary from state to state.19 In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries there were selective efforts to modernize and
standardize the law, but it remained largely a tangled mess.20
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
The idea of a unified commercial code now seems commonplace, but
it was revolutionary for its time.21 Article 9 replaced the myriad of
inconsistent state laws governing different security devices with a single
statute that applied to any consensual secured transaction involving
personal property or fixtures, “regardless of its form.”22 Along with its
comprehensive scope, Article 9 championed a particular form of giving
public notice of security interests. For most transactions, the creditor
would have the option to file a simple document, the financing statement,
in the public files—either at the state or county level.23
Financing statements, in contrast to earlier filed documents required
by most states,24 were simple affairs requiring only minimal pieces of

of property or because of its intended use, it was not possible or feasible for the lender to take it in
pledge.” 1 GILMORE, supra note 16, § 9.1.
19. Id. § 2.2.
20. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV.
367, 379 (1957) (arguing for the overhaul of the chattel security laws).
21. See John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 341, 386 (1988) (discussing the history of the UCC and noting its uniqueness as the
first “realist” statute).
22. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1962).
23. Pre-revision Article 9 offered the states three alternative versions of the basic filing office
provision. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1995). The three versions contained progressively greater amounts of
local, as opposed to central, filing. The First Alternative Subsection of UCC § 9-401(1), for example,
provided that all non-real-estate related financing statements were to be filed with the central filing
office, normally, the secretary of state. In contrast, the Third Alternative Subsection of UCC § 9401(1) required county-level filing for all transactions involving farm equipment, farm products,
farm-related accounts, and consumer goods as well as those where the debtor had a place of business
in only one county in the state.
24. See, e.g., Crane v. Chandler, 5 Colo. 21, 21–22 (1879) (describing the complicated
recording process for chattel mortgages, including filing of the chattel mortgage itself in the public
record).
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information, such as the parties’ names, addresses, signatures, and a
description or indication of the collateral. The financing statement
embodied the notion of “notice filing.”25 It was designed merely to
signal that certain assets of a particular debtor might be encumbered in
favor of a particular creditor.26 Third parties searching in the public
filing system could only expect enough information to set them on a
“trail of inquiry”27 to find all the facts necessary to make an informed
decision about their own course of action.28
C. The Debtor’s Name
The linchpin of the Article 9 filing system has been and remains the
debtor’s name. The debtor’s name has always been mandated on a
financing statement, even as successive versions of Article 9 have
winnowed away the amount of information required for the public
record.29 In addition, the filing officer is required to index financing
statements according to the debtor’s name.30 Thus, searching parties
25. See U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (2001) (commenting on the Code’s explicit adoption of the
“notice filing” concept).
26. I say “might” be encumbered because there was no guarantee that the parties listed on the
financing statement had in fact executed a security agreement or, even if they had, that the
description of collateral on the financing statement matched that on the security agreement. In most
cases, a written security agreement is a necessary element for attachment and enforceability of a
security interest. U.C.C. § 9-203(a), (b)(3)(A). See Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs. v. Swersky (In re
Swersky), No. 3:98-CV-0587-G, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2860, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1999)
(holding that the parties had failed to execute a proper security agreement).
27. See Magna First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Ill., 553 N.E.2d 64, 66 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (“The purpose of the financing statement is to put third parties on notice.”); RAY D. HENSON,
HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 64 (2d ed.
1979) (“The purpose of a financing statement is simply to give notice to the world that designated
parties have entered into a secured transaction covering described collateral. The details must be
learned from the parties.”).
28. The Code provides a mechanism by which the debtor (and thereby the debtor’s other
creditors and purchasers) may obtain information from the secured party. See U.C.C.
§ 9-210 (requiring the secured party to respond to a debtor request for accounting of the unpaid
secured obligation and/or for a list of collateral). Secured parties who fail to respond in a timely
manner to debtor requests for information may be liable for actual and statutory damages and may
also be limited to the collateral or the amount of debt listed in the debtor’s request. Id. § 9-625(f),
(g).
29. Compare U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (2001), with U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972). Interestingly, the
1962 version of Article 9 did not expressly require the debtor’s name on a financing statement, only
the debtor’s signature. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1962). Even so, courts frequently required the debtor’s
name as well. McMillin v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fowler), 407 F. Supp. 799, 802 (W.D.
Okla. 1975); In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369, 371–72 (M.D. Ga. 1973); In re Levins, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1076, 1078 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1970).
30. See U.C.C. § 9-519(c) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1972); U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1962).
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inevitably search for financing statements under the name of the person
with whom they are contemplating a transaction to determine whether
prior secured creditors claim an interest in any or all of that person’s
assets.
1. Pre-revision Article 9 requirements
Given the prime importance of the debtor’s name as the gateway to
the filing system, many pre-revision Article 9 disputes centered on the
sufficiency of the debtor’s name on the financing statement. Whereas the
1962 version of Article 9 did not require any particular name of the
debtor, the 1972 version offered a simple, if only marginally helpful,
statement as to which name of a debtor should be used on a financing
statement: “A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the
debtor if it gives the individual, partnership or corporate name of the
debtor, whether or not it adds other trade names or the names of
partners.”31 The Official Comment to that section emphasized that
secured parties should not use debtor trade names alone on financing
statements: “Trade names are deemed to be too uncertain and too likely
not to be known to the secured party or person searching the record, to
form the basis for a filing system.”32
In addition to the meager identification of the debtor name and the
warning about trade names, the 1972 Code carried forward from the
1962 Code the “substantial compliance” standard for filed financing
statements: “A financing statement substantially complying with the
requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor
errors which are not seriously misleading.”33 The Official Comment to
that provision made it clear that courts should not hold filing creditors to
an inhuman standard of precision, noting that Article 9 “is designed to
discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of [filing]
requirements in which courts have occasionally indulged themselves.”34
In applying these provisions to debtor name disputes, courts
confronted basically two types of errors committed by secured parties in
putting the debtor’s name on a financing statement. The first error
involved selecting an “incorrect” name of the debtor to put on the public
documents. Secured creditors committing the first error might use a trade
31.
32.
33.
34.
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name of a debtor by itself—e.g., the creditor uses the debtor’s trade
name, “Hilton Inn,” rather than its official partnership name, “Beacon
Realty Investment Company.”35 The second error consisted of selecting
the “correct” name but spelling it incorrectly on the financing
statement.36
2. Early pre-revision cases
For many years, courts were divided on the first issue regarding the
use of trade names, nicknames, prior names, and so forth on a financing
statement. Some courts were sympathetic to the filing creditor and
upheld financing statements containing trade names or nicknames,
particularly where the debtor was primarily known by these “non-legal”
names.37 In addition, courts could be somewhat forgiving where the
name used was similar to the debtor’s legal name—e.g., Platt Fur Co. for
Henry Platt.38 Many courts, however, took to heart the Official Comment
discouraging the use of trade names and held that the debtor’s trade name

35. Pearson v. Salina Coffee House, Inc., 831 F.2d 1531, 1536–37 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding
a financing statement using debtor’s trade name to be fatally defective); see also Brown v. Belarus
Mach., Inc. (In re Serv. Lawn & Power, Inc.), 83 B.R. 515, 520 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (holding
that a financing statement listing the debtor’s president as the debtor rather than the legal name of
the corporate debtor was legally insufficient).
36. For example, the secured party might set forth the debtor’s name as “Silvermine
Company” when its legal name was “Silverline Company.” See District of Columbia v. Thomas
Funding Corp., 593 A.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that such an error rendered a
financing statement legally insufficient); see also In re Brawn, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1031, 1037–39
(Bankr. D. Me. 1969) (containing a financing statement that misspelled Brawn as Brown); Bank of
N. Am. v. Bank of Nutley, 227 A.2d 535, 538–39 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) (containing a
financing statement that misspelled Kaplan as Kaplas); Nat’l Cash Register Co. v. Valley Nat’l
Bank, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 396, 396–97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (containing a financing statement that
misspelled Borgwald as Boywald).
37. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank of Perry (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir.
1981) (observing that the debtor was universally known by the community as “Elite Boats, Division
of Glasco, Inc.” even though its legal name was “Glasco, Inc.”). A couple of pre-UCC cases also
adopted this point of view. See Seder v. Zakaras, 35 F.2d 729, 730 (1st Cir. 1929) (stating that a
chattel mortgage would be more effective filed in the debtor’s trade name than in his individual
name); Refrigerator Disc. Corp. v. Tatelbaum (In re Nickulas), 117 F. Supp. 590, 594 (D. Md. 1954)
(noting that creditors were more likely to know the debtor by his trade name rather than his
individual legal name).
38. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966); see also Star Auto. Warehouse, Inc. v.
Spears (In re Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc.), 156 B.R. 300, 302 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993) (holding
that the use of the debtor’s trade name, Thriftway Auto Stores, was adequate where the debtor’s
legal name was Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc.); In re Clairmont Pharmacy, Inc., 8 B.R. 695, 696
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (stating that the use of the debtor’s trade name, Clairmont Skyland
Pharmacy, was sufficient where the debtor’s legal name was Clairmont Pharmacy, Inc.).
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used alone rendered a filed financing statement seriously misleading.39
Furthermore, some judicial decisions invalidated financing statements
using a debtor’s nickname instead of his or her legal name.40 In both
instances, the antipathy to trade names and nicknames seemed to be
based on the concern that future searching parties would not know those
names or think to search under them.41
The second principal type of error found on financing statements
consisted of misspelling, or setting forth incorrectly, the “correct” debtor
name. In other words, the secured party attempted to use what it believed
was the proper legal name of the debtor but ended up omitting or adding
words or misspelling the name. For example, one secured creditor listed
the debtor as “Raymond F. Sargent Co., Inc.” when the debtor’s correct
legal name was “Raymond F. Sargent, Inc.”42 Another secured lender set
forth the debtor’s last name as “Brown” whereas it was actually spelled
“Brawn.”43 Courts deciding these cases did not appear to be any more
tolerant of the second kind of error than the first, focusing on the
magnitude of the error rather than the type of error.44
39. See Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough (In re Thomas), 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972)
(holding that use of trade name and omission of debtor’s real name was a fatal defect); In re Firth,
363 F. Supp. 369 (M.D. Ga. 1973) (holding that a financing statement that shows the name of the
debtor only in his unregistered trade name is legally insufficient to create a security interest); Bank
of Miss., Tupelo v. Pongetti (In re Hill), 363 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (holding that a
financing statement giving only debtor’s trade name without cross-filing under debtor’s individual
name constituted a fatal defect).
40. See Burnett v. J. I. Case Credit Corp. (In re Arnold), 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1479 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (deciding that the use of the debtor’s nickname, Jack Arnold, invalidated
the financing statement where the debtor’s legal name was Herschel J. Arnold); Cent. Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co. of Enid v. Cmty. Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 528 P.2d 710, 713 (Okla. 1974) (holding that
the use of the debtor’s nickname, Lee Anderson, was insufficient where the debtor’s legal name was
James L. Anderson).
41. Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Ga. 1979), aff’d, 604 F.2d 669 (5th
Cir. 1979).
42. In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 583, 593 (D. Me. 1970)
(holding such a mistake fatal to the financing statement’s effectiveness).
43. In re Brawn, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1031, 1033 (D. Me. 1969). In cases
involving “pure” misspellings, it is often difficult to determine whether the mistake occurred because
of a typographical error or because of a misunderstanding as to the proper spelling. For example,
setting forth “Kaplas” rather than “Kaplan” is perhaps more likely to be a typographical error—i.e.,
accidentally striking the wrong key on the keyboard—whereas setting forth “Tri-State Moulded
Plastics” as “Tri-State Molded Plastics” is perhaps more likely the result of a misunderstanding of
the proper spelling of the debtor’s name. It is not apparent that the cause of the error, typographical
or otherwise, should have an effect on the outcome of the case.
44. Some courts adhered to the almost curiously quaint doctrine of idem sonans, under which
a misspelled name was adequate if it was pronounced more or less the same as the properly spelled
name. See, e.g., Corporate Financers, Inc. v. Voyageur Trading Co., 519 N.W.2d 238, 242–43
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Two different approaches to applying the substantial compliance
standard to debtor-name errors emerged in the pre-revision cases. Under
the first approach, courts determined whether the error was minor or
significant, based primarily on the extent to which the name on the
financing statement differed from the debtor’s actual name.45 In applying
this approach, judges focused almost mechanically on whether the
financing statement name differed by one or several letters from the
debtor’s real name, whether the error occurred at the beginning of the
name or the end, and so forth.46
In some cases, the court went further and analyzed the deviation in
light of the filing system involved—i.e., computerized versus manual,47
searcher access versus call slip method,48 large versus small database.49
For example, spelling the debtor’s name “Kaplam” rather than “Kaplan”
would probably not thwart future searchers in a small, rural county using
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “Voyager” was adequate on a financing statement where the
debtor’s name was spelled “Voyageur”); Starbuck v. Esparza (In re Esparza), 821 P.2d 1216, 1220–
22 (Wash. 1992) (holding that “Esparsa” was adequate on a financing statement where the debtor’s
name was spelled “Esparza”).
45. One court stressed that the search methodology employed by the filing office could not
determine whether or not a financing statement was defective and suggested that there should be an
absolute standard of legal sufficiency divorced from a particular state’s filing and searching
procedures: “A financing statement cannot be misleading to some but not to others. If a defective
financing statement is not misleading, it imparts notice to the world.” Pongetti v. Deposit Guar. Nat’l
Bank (In re Strickland), 94 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1988).
46. See, e.g., In re Clairmont Pharmacy, Inc., 8 B.R. 695, 696 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981)
(finding, without any particular analysis, that the debtor’s name on the financing statement was
sufficient because it deviated from the debtor’s true name merely by the addition of the word
“Skyland” after the first word of the debtor’s name).
47. See, e.g., Star Auto. Warehouse, Inc. v. Spears (In re Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc.), 156
B.R. 300, 302 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993) (“It is fatuous, especially in the commercial context, for
one to argue that searching for one narrow entry in an electronic database is a reasonable search.”).
48. See, e.g., In re Reeco Elec. Co., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 238, 241 (D. Me. 1976) (describing
the call slip method of access to the public files); Cain v. L.B. Smith, Inc. (In re Stebow Constr.
Co.), 73 B.R. 459, 461 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987) (same). Under the call slip method, searchers do not
have direct access to the UCC filings. Instead, they must fill out a call slip with the name that they
want searched and then submit that slip to the clerk in the secretary of state’s office. The clerk will
normally search only for financing statements on which the debtor’s name exactly matches the name
on the call slip. Reeco Elec., 415 F. Supp. at 241. Obviously, clerks in their individual discretion
could call the searchers’ attention to a financing statement with a debtor name that is similar to but
not exactly the same as that on the call slip.
49. See, e.g., In re A.C. Ballard, 100 B.R. 526, 531 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1989) (citing Kay Auto.
Warehouse, Inc. v. McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc. (In re McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc.), 51 B.R.
511, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1985)) (noting the impact of the size of the filing database on the ease of
searching); In re Wishart, 10 U.C.C Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1296, 1298 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1972)
(distinguishing filings in small county office from “numerous financing statements . . . filed
statewide in one office as in Michigan”).
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a manual filing system where the searcher could physically access the
records. In that scenario, the searcher looking for “Kaplan” would be
“riffling”50 through a set of financing statements or index cards, would
presumably see “Kaplam” before it reached “Kaplan,” and would not be
confronted with many names spelled similarly or identically. On the
other hand, the same error might be highly significant in a central
computerized filing system in a populous state. A searcher entering the
name “Kaplan” in a computerized database would probably not be led to
the filing under “Kaplam”; in addition, the searcher would have any
number of filings under “Kaplan” to go through before finding the
appropriate party without having to worry about “Kaplam” or other
misspellings.
3. Evolution of pre-revision standards
The mechanistic comparison of the debtor’s correct name and the
one used on the financing statement gradually yielded to a more holistic
standard based on the “reasonably diligent searcher.”51 Under the latter
standard, courts examined whether or not a reasonably diligent searcher
employing accepted search techniques would likely find the financing
statement with the incorrect debtor name.52 The application of the
standard was heavily dependent on all the facts and circumstances of a
particular case.53
Whether the evolution away from the mechanical comparison of
names toward the seemingly more flexible “reasonably diligent searcher”
standard actually affected the resolution of individual cases is debatable.
It is apparent that many courts simply applied the old standard under the
guise of a new name. In fact, some courts applying the “reasonably
diligent searcher” standard still made a superficial comparison between
the debtor’s actual name and the name on the financing statement to

50. See Kay Auto., 51 B.R. at 514 (describing the card “riffling” technique).
51. E.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907
F.2d 1430, 1434–35 (4th Cir. 1990).
52. TMMB Funding Corp. v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 523 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App.
Div. 1988) (citing JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-16,
at 957–58 (2d ed. 1980)).
53. One court chided judges in other cases who had mistakenly decided that the debtor name
question was an issue of law and had “ignore[d] the essentially factual nature of the inquiry.” Kay
Auto., 51 B.R. at 513–14; accord Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc. (In re
Tyler), 23 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (“The determination of whether or not an error is
seriously misleading is essentially a factual one.”).
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determine whether the two names were “close enough.”54 Criticism of
both approaches, however, began to emerge as courts55 and
commentators56 found fault with the subjectivity inherent in them. Both
the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard and the “close enough”
standard allowed judges to second-guess what searchers should or should
not have been able to discover had they tried hard enough. This
subjectivity cut against the core UCC principle of promoting certainty
and efficiency in commercial transactions.57 This uneasiness about the
existing law regarding debtor names on financing statements drove the
revisers of Article 9 toward a more objective standard—one that courts
could apply, it was hoped, with consistency and precision.58
III. THE DEBTOR’S NAME UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9
Revised Article 9 adheres to the substantial compliance standard for
measuring financing statement adequacy that existed in the old law.
Under this standard, financing statements “substantially satisfying”
Article 9 requirements are still effective even if they contain “minor
errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the financing
statement seriously misleading.”59 The revised statute, therefore, still
permits small mistakes by the secured party, provided that the financing
statement gives adequate notice to third parties.
54. See, e.g., Scott Truck & Tractor Co. v. Alma Tractor & Equip., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 815, 818
(Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that a reasonably diligent searcher would find a financing statement
with a debtor name error because “[b]oth names begin with the same letter and both names contain
‘M.P.G. Enterprises’”).
55. See, e.g., Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re
Wardcorp, Inc.), 133 B.R. 210, 217 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (criticizing the reasonably diligent
searcher standard as fostering “post hoc balancing of equities”); First Nat’l Bank v. Strong, 663
N.E.2d 432, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (faulting any rule that “would burden a searcher with guessing
at misspellings and various configurations of a legal name”).
56. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Choosing the Law Governing
Perfection: The Data and Politics of Article 9 Filing, 79 MINN. L. REV. 663, 666 (1995) (noting that
the reduction of costs associated with the filing system is “an overriding issue in the [Article 9]
revision process”); Penney, supra note 11, at 1422 (“Requiring absolute precision in the debtor’s
name on financing statements would provide a workable standard in both individual, as well as
corporate debtor situations.”).
57. See Margit Livingston, Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in Collateral Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 N.C. L. REV. 115, 178–84 (1994) (discussing the
effect of Karl Llewellyn’s jurisprudence on the formulation of the U.C.C.).
58. In its final report, the Article 9 Study Group, appointed in 1990 by the NCCUSL and the
ALI, recommended changes to Article 9 and specifically recommended that state filing systems
increase the utility of those systems. See UCC REPORT, supra note 7, at 88–90 (1992).
59. U.C.C. § 9-506(a) (2001).
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Regarding the specific issue of the debtor’s name, however, new
Article 9 takes a stronger stand. In an apparent attempt to resolve any
ambiguities in the old law, the revision states that “a financing statement
that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance
with Section 9-503(a) [the Code provision defining the debtor’s name] is
seriously misleading.”60 The phrase “fails sufficiently to provide the
name of the debtor” implies that errors in the debtor’s name are fatal to
the financing statement’s effectiveness, whether the error is minor or not.
All debtor name mistakes presumptively render the financing statement
seriously misleading.61 This change in the law singles out the debtor’s
name as the most important piece of information on the financing
statement.62
A. The Single Search Standard
But, despite this new emphasis on complete accuracy, the revisers
recognized that secured parties may be excused from some mistakes in
setting forth the debtor’s name if those errors do not affect a searcher’s
ability to find the financing statement in the official public database.
Hence, the new statute provides a safe harbor that saves financing
statements with errors in the debtor’s name. If “a search of the records of
the filing office under the debtor’s correct name, using the filing office’s
standard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that
fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor . . . , the name
provided does not make the financing statement seriously misleading.”63
60. Id. § 9-506(b). Section 9-503(a) specifies which name of the debtor is required on a
financing statement. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. For example, “a financing
statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor . . . if the debtor is a registered organization,
only if the financing statement provides the name of the debtor as indicated on the public record of
the debtor’s jurisdiction which shows the debtor to have been organized.” U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1).
61. See 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 31-12, at 174–75 (5th ed. 2002) (“[I]f the standard search logic . . . fails to find a financing
statement because the name is incorrect, that renders the financing statement not only non-compliant
with 9-502 and 9-503, but also means that it fails ‘substantially’ to satisfy the ‘requirements of this
Part’ under 9-506 and so is ‘seriously misleading.’”).
62. From time to time, some commentators have suggested that taxpayer identification
numbers (“TINs”) be required on financing statements as a means of ensuring absolute identifiability
of particular debtors and thus improving the accuracy of the search process. Others have noted the
problems associated with mandating TINs on financing statements, including, in particular, privacy
concerns with respect to Social Security Numbers. Edward S. Adams et al., A Revised Filing System:
Recommendations and Innovations, 79 MINN. L. REV. 877, 899–900 (1995). Although Revised
Article 9 does provide a space for a TIN on the model form, it does not go so far as to require
inclusion of the debtor’s TIN on the financing statement. U.C.C. § 9-521(a).
63. U.C.C. § 9-506(c).
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This provision might be denominated the “single search standard” in
contrast to the pre-revision “reasonably diligent searcher standard.”
Thus, under Revised Article 9, a third party must only search once for
financing statements for any particular debtor.
This “single search” should consist of entering the debtor’s “correct”
name into the filing office’s database and observing whether that search
produces any recorded financing statements. If it does, then a searcher
presumably must take the additional step of determining whether the
financing statements found pertain to the person or entity with which
they are dealing.64 If the search does not produce any matches, then,
under the “single search” standard, the searcher has finished searching
and may assume that there are no filed financing statements recorded
against that particular person or entity. Hence, the new law impliedly
defines reasonable diligence by searchers as the undertaking of a single
search under the debtor’s correct name.65
B. The Debtor’s Name Defined
Revised Article 9 also elaborates on the question of what constitutes
the debtor’s “name” for filing and searching purposes. As discussed
previously, the 1962 Code was silent on which debtor name should be
used on the financing statement, most likely because the statute did not
require the debtor’s name as such on the financing statement, only the
debtor’s signature.66 The 1972 version of Article 9 added the simple
statement that “[a] financing statement sufficiently shows the name of
the debtor if it gives the individual, partnership, or corporate name of the
debtor, whether or not it adds other trade names or names of partners.”67
One could infer from this statement that filers should use the individual’s
name for an individual debtor, the partnership name for a partnership,
and the corporate name for a corporation. Left unanswered was the
64. For example, if a search under the name “Mary P. Anderson” produced three financing
statements, the searcher would have to determine whether they pertained to the “Mary P. Anderson”
in whom the searcher was interested. This determination would most likely be made by checking the
debtor’s address on the financing statement or making further inquiry of the debtor or the listed
secured party.
65. Even before the revision of Article 9, some courts were already defining a “reasonably
diligent search” as one in which the searcher made a single search under the debtor’s legal name.
See, e.g., Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Wardcorp, Inc.),
133 B.R. 210, 216–17 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990); First Nat’l Bank v. Strong, 663 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996).
66. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1962).
67. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972).
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appropriate name to use for unincorporated associations, trusts, estates,
and other entities.
Revised Article 9 tackles this issue in somewhat more detail. For
registered organizations,68 for example, a financing statement
sufficiently sets forth the debtor’s name “only if the financing statement
provides the name of the debtor indicated on the public record of the
debtor’s jurisdiction of organization which shows the debtor to have been
organized.”69 The revised statute also sets forth the appropriate name to
use for estates and trusts.70 Finally, in the catchall provision for “all other
cases,” the new law requires that the secured party set forth the
individual or organizational name of the debtor, if the debtor in fact has a
name.71 If the debtor does not have a name, then the secured party
should list the names of the “partners, members, associates, or other
persons comprising the debtor.”72
Taken as a whole, Revised Article 9’s provisions regarding the
debtor’s name appear to shift most of the burden of dealing with errors
squarely onto the filing secured creditor’s shoulders. Filing creditors
must set forth the debtor’s name accurately on the financing statement or
risk lack of perfection. Searching parties need only perform a “single
search” to identify prior secured parties. They are not expected to search
in a database other than the filing office’s official database, to search
68. A registered organization is defined as “an organization organized solely under the law of
a single State or the United States and as to which the State or the United States must maintain a
public record showing the organization to have been organized.” U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70) (2001). The
Official Comments suggest that this term will ordinarily include corporations, limited partnerships,
and limited liability companies. Id. § 9-503 cmt. 2; see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15621(a) (West
2006) (requiring registration with the Secretary of State for limited partnerships); FLA. STAT. §
608.407(1) (2005) (requiring registration for limited liability companies); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/210 (2006) (requiring registration for corporations); N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1500(a) (McKinney
2005) (requiring registration for limited liability partnerships). This definition presumably would not
include general partnerships and unincorporated associations.
69. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1). “Jurisdiction of organization” is defined as “the jurisdiction under
whose law the organization is organized.” Id. § 9-102(a)(50). See Harry C. Sigman, The Filing
System Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61, 72 (1999) (commenting that the new rule
regarding registered organization names “enables filers and searchers to rely with certainty on the
debtor’s exact name obtained from an objective and publicly available source”).
70. For estates, the financing statement should provide the decedent’s name and also indicate
that the debtor is an estate. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(2). For trusts and trustees, the financing statement
should provide “the name specified for the trust in its organic documents or, if no name is specified .
. . the name of the settlor and additional information sufficient to distinguish the debtor from other
trusts having one or more of the same settlors.” Id. § 9-503(a)(3)(A). In addition, the financing
statement should indicate the debtor’s status as a trust or trustee. Id. § 9-503(a)(3)(B).
71. Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(A).
72. Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(B).
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using any method other than that office’s “standard search logic,”73 or to
use anything other than the debtor’s “correct” name in their search
requests.74 For registered organizations, such as corporations and limited
liability companies, the debtor’s correct name is clearly, and solely, its
official registered name.75 For other types of organizations and for
individuals, the correct name of the debtor is not defined, and that issue,
as will be seen, quickly generated litigation.76
C. The Policy Behind Revised Article 9
The apparent rationale for Revised Article 9’s rules regarding debtor
names can be found in a number of pre-revision cases and reflects the
attitude that filing creditors should bear the burden of accuracy rather
than searching parties bearing the burden of inaccuracy.77 Article 9 itself
is fairly silent as to its policy perspective, but pre-revision courts often
took the view that because so little is required of the secured party using
the filing system, it is appropriate to demand precision in setting forth the
debtor’s name.78 Additionally, the secured party has the means by which
to find out the debtor’s correct name before filing whereas searchers can
only guess at various possible misspellings or variations of the debtor’s
name that might exist in filed financing statements.79 In other words, it is
more efficient and equitable to require accuracy by the filing creditor

73. The Official Comments to section 9-506 emphasize the singularity of the searcher’s
anticipated search: “A financing statement that is seriously misleading under this section is
ineffective even if it is disclosed by (i) using a search logic other than that of the filing office to
search the official records or (ii) using the filing office’s standard search logic to search a data base
other than that of the filing office.” Id. § 9-506 cmt. 2.
74. Id. § 9-506(c)–(d).
75. Id. § 9-503 cmt. 2.
76. See infra notes 89–106 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re
Wardcorp, Inc.), 133 B.R. 210, 215 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (expressing this view).
78. See, e.g., Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc. (In re Tyler), 23 B.R.
806, 809 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (“[E]rrors should be judged strictly against the secured party,
exactly because so little is required of the creditor.”).
79. For example, should a searcher who knows the potential debtor as “William Johnson” be
required to search under “Johnsen,” “Jonson,” and “Jonsen” as well as various versions of the first
name, such as “Will,” “Bill,” and “Billy”? See First Nat’l Bank v. Strong, 663 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (“[A] rule that would burden a searcher with guessing at misspellings and various
configurations of a legal name would not provide creditors with the certainty that is essential in
commercial transactions.”).
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than to demand “reasonable diligence,” however defined, from searching
creditors.80
IV. POST-REVISION CASE LAW
Since Revised Article 9 went into effect over five years ago, courts
have had several opportunities to apply the new rules regarding the
accuracy of debtor names on financing statements. Though a few courts
are still holding tight to the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard,81
most have seemingly read new Article 9 as it is written and have dropped
the hammer on the filing creditor who has made an error in the debtor’s
name that prevents subsequent searchers from finding the financing
statement using a single search under the debtor’s correct legal name.
Though a few pockets of resistance to the new regime remain, the days
of latitude for the filing party are largely over. The following review of
the case lawreveals that various courts have treated the debtor name issue
more or less consistently, regardless of whether the debtor is an
individual or a registered organization.
A. Cases Involving Individual Debtors
In three post-revision cases involving the Kansas filing system, the
courts confronted the question of what errors are acceptable where the
debtor is an individual. The first court to address the issue applied the
pre-revision “reasonably diligent searcher” standard,82 but in the next
case, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel used the strict
80. One of the drafters of Revised Article 9 recently summarized on a UCC listserv the
assumed cost effectiveness of requiring the secured party to be accurate in setting forth the debtor’s
name on a financing statement:
[T]he Drafting Committee for revised Article 9 made a judgment call that the overall
secured lending system would be better off by imposing a one-time cost on a secured
party filing a financing statement to get the debtor’s name right, thereby improving
transparency and relieving the system of the cost of a searching secured party making
multiple searches and having to retain the residual risk that there might be one more
search under a “close enough” name that it could have done.
Posting of Steven Weise to ucclaw-l-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (Oct. 25, 2006) (on file with
author); see also G. Ray Warner, Using the Strong-Arm Power To Attack Name Errors Under
Revised Article 9, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2001, at 22 (stating that new Article 9 “replaces
[the] reasonableness standard with a precise standard based on the computerized search logic used
by the relevant filing office”) (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., In re Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc., 305 B.R. 347, 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2003); Nazar v. Bucklin Nat’l Bank (In re Erwin), No. 02-10227, 02-5176, 2003 WL 21513158, at
*7–8 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 27, 2003).
82. In re Erwin, 2003 WL 21513158, at *8.
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standard suggested by Revised Article 9.83 The Kansas Supreme Court
soon followed with another decision applying that strict standard.84
In the first case, Nazar v. Bucklin National Bank (In re Erwin),85 the
debtor’s legal name was “Michael A. Erwin,” and the secured party had
filed a financing statement setting forth the debtor’s name as “Mike
Erwin.”86 In the debtor’s bankruptcy, the trustee tried to avoid the bank’s
security interest as unperfected because the debtor’s name was listed
incorrectly.87 The bankruptcy court held that the secured party’s
financing statement was valid, even though an electronic search of the
filing records under the name “Michael A. Erwin” did not reveal the
financing statement.88
The court stated that the traditional “reasonably diligent searcher”
test survived the enactment of Revised Article 9, at least with respect to
debtors who are individuals.89 Article 9, the court noted, does not define
“correct name” or even “name” for individual debtors,90 and there is no
reason to think that the drafters necessarily meant “legal name” when
they required filing parties to place the debtor’s name on a financing
statement.91 In this case, the debtor frequently used the name “Mike
Erwin,”92 and the court held that his nickname was in fact one of his
“names” or a “correct name” for him.93 As such, it was sufficient for use

83. Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 75 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004).
84. Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 59 (Kan. 2006).
85. In re Erwin, 2003 WL 21513158, at *1.
86. Id. at *2.
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id. at *12.
89. Id. at *8. Interestingly, the court applied Revised Article 9 in judging the sufficiency of
the Bank’s financing statement even though it was filed in 1999. Referring to one of the new law’s
transition rules, the court stated that “if the pre-enactment security interest did not satisfy the
perfection requirements of revised Article Nine, the creditor had one year from enactment, or until
July 1, 2002, to satisfy the perfection requirements of revised Article Nine.” Id. at *1 (citing KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 84-9-703(b)(3) (2002 Supp.), which is basically Kansas’s version of U.C.C. § 9703(b)(3) (2001)). The court ignored, however, the transition rule that allows pre-enactment
financing statements to remain effective for the normal five-year period without re-filing by the
creditor. U.C.C. § 9-705(c). Arguably, the Bank’s financing statement should have been evaluated
by old Article 9 standards. Given that the court employed the “reasonably diligent searcher”
standard, its reliance on Revised Article 9 did not determine the case’s outcome.
90. Id. at *6.
91. Id. at *10.
92. The debtor’s name on all of the Bank’s loan documents was “Mike Erwin,” including the
W-9 tax form request for the debtor’s taxpayer identification number and certification. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *11. The court emphasized that nothing in Article 9 mandates the use of an
individual debtor’s full legal name on a financing statement. Id. at *10. In fact, the Kansas
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on a financing statement. According to the court, searchers could fairly
be required to use “reasonable diligence” in seeking out financing
statements naming the debtor, and such diligence demanded searches
under alternative names such as “Erwin” or “M. Erwin,” both of which
would have revealed the Bank’s financing statement.94 Thus, the first
post-revision court to tackle the debtor name question seemed wedded to
the pre-revision standard, at least with respect to the names of
individuals.
In the second Kansas case, Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re
Kinderknecht),95 the debtor’s legal name was “Terrance Joseph
Kinderknecht,” but the secured party filed a financing statement against
him under his nickname, “Terry J. Kinderknecht.”96 Following the
reasoning of the Erwin case, the bankruptcy court held that the filing was
sufficient under Article 9.97 The court stressed that Article 9 did not
define “correct name” for individuals nor did it expressly require the use
of legal names for individual debtors.98 In this case, the court found that
“Terry J. Kinderknecht” was undoubtedly a name that the debtor used—
in fact, he signed his bankruptcy petition as such.99
Additionally, the court compared in some detail the two
computerized Article 9 databases available in Kansas—one official and
one unofficial.100 The unofficial database’s flexible search parameters
made it more likely that a searcher would find a financing statement
against any particular individual. After noting the availability of the more
flexible unofficial search mechanism, the court held that a financing
statement filed under a debtor’s nickname could never be seriously
misleading if a reasonable searcher could find it in the unofficial
database, if not the official database.101

administrative regulations implementing new Article 9 suggest that “human judgment still plays a
role in searches for individual debtor names ‘that are not automated.’” Id. at *7.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 300 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003), rev’d,
308 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 48.
97. Id. at 55–56.
98. Id. at 49.
99. Id. at 48.
100. Id. at 51–56. The official database, maintained by the Kansas Secretary of State’s office,
generates state-certified search results, as described in U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (2001). Kinderknecht, 300
B.R. at 51. An “unofficial” search or database refers to any other electronic information retrieval
system, whether maintained by the Secretary of State or a private entity. Id. at 51–56.
101. The court stated:
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The bankruptcy court decision in Kinderknecht was short-lived,
however. Six months after it was rendered, the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel for the Tenth Circuit reversed it, relying on several policy
considerations and a close reading of the Article 9 name provisions.102
The panel concluded that the Article 9 requirement of the debtor’s name
on a financing statement, in fact, means that the debtor’s “legal name”
must be used.103 Noting that Article 9 makes the use of business entities’
trade names by themselves on financing statements legally insufficient,
the panel decided that a “different standard should not apply to
individual debtors.”104 In addition, the suggested statutory forms for a
financing statement have a space entitled “DEBTOR’S EXACT FULL
LEGAL NAME.”105 The suggested forms, though not mandated by the
statute, clearly indicated to the panel that the drafters disapproved of
nicknames.106
In addition to relying on statutory interpretation, the panel advanced
four policy considerations to justify its holding. First, requiring the
debtor’s legal name simplifies filing; and second, it simplifies
searching.107 Strict enforcement of the rule means that secured parties
know that they need to use the debtor’s legal name on the financing
statement, and third parties know that they need to search the public
records only under the debtor’s legal name.108 Third, mandating the use
of the debtor’s legal name will reduce future litigation about the
sufficiency of a particular non-legal name (such as a nickname) on a
financing statement and about the ability of a “reasonably diligent

[A] searcher must use reason and select alternative names as search criteria to
ensure a realistic possibility of finding a financing statement. When a bankruptcy
petition in the legal name of the debtor is signed with a nickname representing
the debtor’s first name, . . . the searcher must use that nickname as a search
criterion to be considered as having acted reasonably.
Id. at 56. Of course, even a reasonably diligent third party searching the files before the debtor’s
bankruptcy would have no way of seeing a bankruptcy petition signed by the debtor. The court,
however, seems to be suggesting that if the debtor signed official documents such as his bankruptcy
petition with his nickname, then he would be likely to use that name in some capacity in his dealings
with the third party searcher.
102. Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 72 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004).
103. Id. at 75.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 76 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-521 (Supp. 2005) (showing UCC Financing
Statement)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 75.
108. Id.
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searcher” to locate the financing statement with that name.109 Finally, the
panel observed that requiring the filing creditor to use the debtor’s legal
name is not unduly difficult or burdensome.110 In fact, because filing
creditors conduct their own searches before entering into a secured
transaction with the debtor, they should already be aware of the debtor’s
legal name.111
The third Kansas case involving an error in an individual debtor’s
name cemented the position developed by the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel in Kinderknecht that the secured party must set forth the
debtor’s legal name on a filed financing statement with complete
accuracy. In Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens National Bank, the
Kansas Supreme Court held that a one-letter omission in the debtor’s
name rendered a financing statement seriously misleading.112 In
Pankratz, the first secured party had filed a financing statement listing
the debtor as “Roger House,” a misspelling of his actual legal name,
“Rodger House.”113 The second secured party, which had spelled the
debtor’s name correctly, challenged the sufficiency of the filing.114 The
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the first secured party
based on its earlier filing.115
On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals first noted that the omission
of a single letter from the debtor’s first name would seem to be a “minor
error or omission” under the substantial compliance standard of UCC §
9-506(a).116 The real question, the court stated, is not the magnitude of
the error but “whether a reasonably diligent searcher would find the prior
security interest.”117 Under the strict requirements of Revised Article 9,
the “reasonably diligent searcher” need make only a single search under
the debtor’s correct legal name in the official public database.118 The
109. Id. at 75–76.
110. Id. at 76.
111. Id.
112. Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 59 (Kan. 2006).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 59–60.
115. Id. at 59. The general rule for priority among two or more secured parties with security
interests in the same collateral is that the first to file a financing statement against the debtor or the
first to perfect the security interest, whichever occurs earlier, has the first priority. U.C.C. § 9322(a)(1) (2001). Of course, the first filer must have recorded a valid financing statement to gain this
priority position.
116. Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 102 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Kan. Ct. App.
2004) (emphasis omitted), aff’d, 130 P.3d 57, 59 (Kan. 2006).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1168.

132

LIVINGSTON.MRO.DOC

111]

6/20/2007 11:18:40 PM

Filing and Searching in Article 9’s Public Records

court rejected any notion that a third party was expected to search under
various possible names of the debtor or under variant spellings of the
debtor’s legal name.119 Additionally, a reasonable searcher is required
only to seek financing statements in the official UCC database, normally
maintained by the Secretary of State, as opposed to any unofficial
electronic databases that may exist.120
Applying a de novo standard of review, the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court’s decision against the first secured
creditor,121 though the supreme court’s reasoning differed slightly. The
supreme court rejected the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard
altogether and noted that Revised Article 9 sought to impose a “bright
line” rule regarding the sufficiency of the debtor’s name on a financing
statement.122 By requiring that filing creditors set forth the debtor’s
name correctly, the new law has “the effect of shifting the responsibility
of getting the name on the financing statement right to the filing party,
thereby enabling the searching party to rely upon that name and
eliminating the need for multiple searches using variations of the
debtor’s name.”123 The ultimate result of the bright line standard, the
court noted, will be to promote certainty in commercial transactions and
to reduce litigation regarding financing statement adequacy.124
The Kansas Supreme Court also agreed with the appellate court that
searches in unofficial databases do not qualify as searches under Article
9’s safe harbor provision. The court held that it is legally irrelevant that a
searcher could find the erroneous financing statement in a database other
than the official one maintained by the filing office.125 In addition, the
court hewed to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s
Kinderknecht decision in holding that even where individual debtors are
involved, the debtor’s full legal name must appear on the financing

119. Id.
120. Id. In addition to the official Secretary of State database, Kansas maintained an unofficial
database on a temporary internet site, found at http://www.accesskansas.org, during the Article 9
transition period. Id. at 1167–68. This site provided a more flexible search logic that disclosed the
financing statement with the debtor’s name spelled as “Roger” rather than the actual spelling
“Rodger.” Id. at 1168.
121. Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 59 (Kan. 2006).
122. Id. at 62–63 (observing that the amendments to Article 9 “eliminat[ed] the need to
conduct diligent searches”).
123. Id. at 63.
124. Id.
125. Id. (noting that the official filing office search is the “only search that determines whether
a name is seriously misleading” under Article 9).
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statement.126 Taken together, the Kansas Supreme Court’s
pronouncements tighten the compliance standard for the filing secured
party: in all cases the secured party must use the debtor’s legal name on
the financing statement and set forth that name in such a way that it can
be found in the official filing office database by a searcher employing the
debtor’s exact legal name.127 No exceptions will be permitted.
A Georgia appellate court recently adopted the same unforgiving
attitude toward debtor name errors in a case involving an individual
debtor. In All Business Corp. v. Choi, the secured party indicated the
debtor’s name on the financing statement as “Gu, SangWoo” and the
debtor’s trade name as “CCO Check Cashing-Buford.”128 The debtor’s
name was in fact “Sang Woo Gu,” and the trade name was “CCO Check
Cashing.”129 A third party searched for financing statements under the
debtor’s correct legal name and trade name, and the filing office’s
standard search logic did not reveal the secured party’s financing
statement.130 The secured party argued that a “simple stem search”131
under the terms “CCO” and “Gu” did disclose the financing
statement.132
Notwithstanding the success of the “stem” search, the court ruled
that the creditor’s security interest was unperfected, relying on a strict
reading of Article 9 and Georgia case law.133 Again, the errors in
question were extremely slight. The mistake in the trade name was, in
fact, irrelevant since a trade name filing by itself is insufficient.134 The
126. Id. at 66–67 (quoting Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 75 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2004)).
127. For a recent case adopting the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s holding and
reasoning in Kinderknecht, see Genoa National Bank v. Southwest Implement, Inc. (In re Borden),
No. BK05-41272, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2911, at *13–15 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 2, 2006) (holding that
a filing under “Mike Borden” was insufficient where the debtor’s legal name was “Michael
Borden”).
128. All Bus. Corp v. Choi, 634 S.E.2d 400, 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
129. Id.
130. Id. at *15.
131. A stem search involves searching under only part of a name. For example, for “Bates
Auto Sales, Inc.,” one might conduct a stem search using only “Bates.” In searching for “Terrance
Joseph Kinderknecht,” one might enter a search for “Kinderknecht” alone or even “Kinder!”. Stem
searches, of course, increase the number of financing statements retrieved and also augment the
possibility of finding a financing statement with an error in the debtor’s name.
132. All Bus. Corp., 634 S.E.2d at 405.
133. Id. (citing Receivables Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC, 588 S.E.2d
831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
134. U.C.C. § 9-503(c) (2001); see also In re Cruz, No. 04-43119-13, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS
866, at *6–7 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 12, 2005).
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error in the debtor’s legal name was merely the omission of a space in
the debtor’s first name: “SangWoo” rather than the correct “Sang
Woo.”135
B. Cases Involving Registered Organization Debtors
Predictably, the first few post-revision cases involving the debtor’s
name on a financing statement involved individual debtors. Because new
Article 9 does not specify what constitutes the “correct” name for
individual debtors, courts have leeway to interpret the requirement in
various ways. On the other hand, with the new law’s insistence on use of
the publicly registered name of registered organizations, one would not
expect much litigation involving corporate debtors. Presumably, the
secured party knows which name to use where the debtor is a registered
organization—the name on the public registry—and can ensure that the
name is spelled correctly by merely copying the public registry name
onto the financing statement. As one might expect, two post-revision
cases involving registered organization debtors indicate that Article 9 is
to be taken literally when it requires absolute precision with respect to
the names of those debtors.
In Receivables Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC,
the secured party had set forth the debtor’s name on its financing
statement as “Net work Solutions, Inc.” when the debtor’s legal name
was “Network Solutions, Inc.”136 The Georgia appellate court held that
under Revised Article 9, the financing statement was seriously
misleading.137 The parties did not dispute that a search in the filing
office using the debtor’s correct name did not disclose the secured
party’s financing statement.138 Despite the seemingly small error, the
135. This case illustrates the occasional difficulty of ascertaining the proper way to set forth a
non-Anglo name. See infra note 224. It also illustrates the need for the filing office’s search
mechanism to accommodate these types of errors. See infra Part V.
136. Receivables Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC, 588 S.E.2d 831, 832
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
137. Id. at 833. Although the financing statement in question was filed on April 2, 2001,
before the effective date of new Article 9, the court measured its legal sufficiency under the revised
statute. Id. The secured party filed its financing statement in Bartow County, presumably to comply
with old Article 9. Id. at 832. Under new Article 9, almost all filings are made with a central filing
office, and county filings, with a few exceptions, have been eliminated. See U.C.C. § 9-501(a)
(mandating central filings for all transactions except fixture filings and those involving as-extracted
collateral or timber to be cut). Given the move away from county filings, one might question the
level of sophistication of the county’s computerized UCC database at the time the test searches were
made in this case.
138. Receivables Purchasing, 588 S.E.2d at 833.
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court found that Revised Article 9’s insistence on precision causes a
secured creditor to “act[] at his peril if he files the statement under an
incorrect name.”139
In a more recent case, a court once again demanded that the secured
party get a corporate debtor’s name absolutely correct, down to the
inclusion of periods in the proper places. In Host America Corp. v.
Coastline Financial, Inc., the secured party’s assignor had filed a
financing statement listing the debtor as “K W M Electronics
Corporation” with no periods between the initials even though the
debtor’s legal name contained periods between the initials.140 The
debtor’s lessor asserted a lessor’s lien on certain property belonging to
the debtor.141 The secured party claimed that its assignor’s earlier
perfected security interest in the same property had priority over the later
asserted lessor’s lien.142 The court, however, held that the assignor’s
financing statement was seriously misleading based on two grounds.
First, the secured party conceded that the financing statement did not
contain, as required by Article 9, the debtor’s exact legal name because
of the omission of the periods.143 Second, the secured party could not
save the financing statement through the “single search” exception of
UCC § 9-506(c).144 Evidence procured from the Utah Secretary of
State’s office clearly showed that a search under the debtor’s correct
name using the office’s standard search logic would not have revealed
the filed financing statement.145
The federal district court in Host America observed the miniscule
nature of the secured party’s error as well as the extreme limitations of
Utah’s standard search logic.146 But Revised Article 9, the court stated,
is clearly designed to place the burden of accuracy on the filing creditor
139. Id.
140. Host Am. Corp. v. Coastline Fin., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35727, at
*3 (D. Utah May 30, 2006). There was some question as to whether there were spaces after the
periods in the debtor’s names—in other words, “K.W.M.” or “K. W. M.”—but the court stated that it
did not need to address that issue because the secured party’s financing statement contained no
periods whatsoever. Id. at *12.
141. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-3-1 (1953) provides lessors with a lien for unpaid rent on
nonexempt property of the lessee located on the leased premises.
142. Host Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35727, at *7.
143. Id. at *12.
144. Id. at *14–15.
145. The parties apparently submitted affidavits from the director of the Utah Division of
Corporations and Commercial Codes. Id. at *13.
146. Id. (“[T]he filing office’s standard search logic was not capable of compensating for even
minor errors in a debtor’s name.”).
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and to eliminate the need for fact-intensive inquiries as to whether a
reasonably diligent searcher could uncover a financing statement with an
error in the debtor name.147 The court also noted that the “escape hatch”
of section 9-506(c) is at present tied to the filing office’s electronic
sophistication: “By necessity, the breadth of the safe haven . . . will
either expand or contract as the capabilities of the state’s standard search
logic change over time.”148
C. Federal Tax Lien Filings
The decisions in Receivables Purchasing and Host America should
come as no surprise, despite their seemingly draconian results. They
represent a straightforward application of sections 9-503 and 9-506 of
Revised Article 9. But not all courts have followed that straight and
narrow path. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently set searchers’
teeth on edge with a decision concerning the recording of federal tax
liens by applying the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard from the
pre-revision law.149 Although the decision concerned only federal tax
lien filings, it arguably has broader implications for Article 9 searchers.
In Crestmark Bank v. United States (In re Spearing Tool &
Manufacturing Co.), the secured party, Crestmark, attempted to contest
the validity of a previously filed federal tax lien.150 Before advancing
additional funds to the debtor under their security agreement, the creditor
had submitted a lien search to the State of Michigan, using the debtor’s
registered name, “Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co.”151 The search
results indicated no liens, and Crestmark lent the debtor additional
monies.152 Previously, the Internal Revenue Service had filed two
notices of federal tax liens with the Michigan Secretary of State, using
the name “Spearing Tool & MFG Company, Inc.”153
After the debtor filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection,
Crestmark filed a complaint to determine priority to certain pre-petition
accounts receivable collections. Crestmark argued that Revised Article 9
147. Id. at *15.
148. Id. at *14.
149. United States v. Crestmark Bank (In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.), 412 F.3d 653, 655–
56 (6th Cir. 2005).
150. Crestmark Bank v. United States (In re Spearing Tool & Mfg Co.), 292 B.R. 579 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2003), rev’d, 302 B.R. 351 (E.D. Mich. 2003), rev’d, 412 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2005).
151. Id. at 580.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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essentially allows searching parties to use only the debtor’s precise legal
name in their searches, and if such a search does not reveal a filing, the
filing is invalid.154
Apparently relying on preemption doctrine, the bankruptcy court
held that federal, not state, law dictated the form of the notice that must
be filed by the IRS asserting a tax lien against a particular taxpayer.155
Treasury regulations under the federal tax lien statute required only that
the lien notice “identify the taxpayer.”156 The court found that the name
used by the IRS sufficiently identified the taxpayer since it was close to
the debtor’s legal name, it contained a commonly used abbreviation for
“Manufacturing,” and a reasonable search of the records would have
uncovered the IRS’s filing.157
On appeal, the federal district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s
decision and held the IRS filing insufficient to give notice to subsequent
parties.158 The court acknowledged that federal law governed the
adequacy of the federal tax lien notice.159 Under federal law, according
to the court, the applicable test is one of “reasonableness”—i.e.,
“whether a reasonable search of the index would have disclosed the
error-laden federal tax lien.”160 Reasonableness, however, must be
analyzed in light of the recording and searching systems in place in a
particular jurisdiction.161 Although Article 9 as state law does not control
in this instance, it can provide guidance as to “what is reasonable
behavior for searchers in today’s environment.”162 Given the rigidity of
the computerized search logic, under which only exact matches are
retrieved, a searcher trying to find tax lien notices with possible errors in
the taxpayer’s name would have to search under variant spellings of that
154. Crestmark argued that under Revised Article 9, a financing statement must use the
debtor’s official legal name. Id. at 582 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9503(1)(a) (West
2002), which is essentially Michigan’s version of U.C.C. § 9-503(1)(a) (2001)). If the financing
statement sets forth the debtor’s name incorrectly, then it is invalid unless “a search of the records of
the filing office . . . using the filing office’s standard search logic, if any, would disclose [the]
financing
statement
.
.
.
.”
Id.
(citing
MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
ANN.
§ 440.9506 (West 2002), which is essentially Michigan’s version of U.C.C. § 9-506(b)–(c)).
155. Id. at 582–83.
156. Id. at 582. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2)).
157. Id. at 583.
158. Crestmark Bank v. United States (In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.), 302 B.R. 351, 357
(E.D. Mich. 2003), rev’d, 412 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2005).
159. Id. at 355.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 355–56.
162. Id. at 356.
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name.163 Imposing such a burden on searchers would be unreasonable,
the court concluded, and thus the IRS filing was insufficient.164
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
decision and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the government.165 Like the two lower courts, the Court of
Appeals held that federal law controlled the content of the IRS tax lien
notice,166 and that under federal law, the test for notice sufficiency was
the reasonable search standard.167 The court then stated that the
searching creditor in this case did not conduct a “reasonable and diligent
electronic search.”168 A reasonable, diligent party would have searched
for “Spearing Tool & Mfg.,” the name used in the IRS filing, as well as
“Spearing Tool and Manufacturing,” the company’s legal name, because
the ampersand and “Mfg.” are common, standard abbreviations for their
respective words, “so common that, for example, we use them as a rule
in our case citations.”169
This decision, though not surprising, has ramifications for secured or
would-be secured creditors attempting to ascertain the existence of prior
interests in the debtor’s property. Undoubtedly, Revised Article 9 has
simplified the search process for inquiring parties, but those parties will
still need to think creatively about the debtor’s name in conducting
searches for federal tax liens. Anticipating common variant spellings
(e.g., “MFG” for “Manufacturing”) and using truncated portions of the
debtor’s name (e.g., “Spearing Tool”) will continue to be useful
searching techniques. If searchers are using various permutations of the
debtor’s name in their searches for federal tax liens, the argument
becomes that it is not much, if any, additional burden for them to use
such variations in their searches for Article 9 security interests. Creditors
163. Id. at 357.
164. See id. (“Fairness to third parties dictates that in cases like this, where a reasonable
searcher would not have notice of the federal tax lien, the IRS’s liens should not have priority over
other lenders.”).
165. United States v. Crestmark Bank (In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.), 412 F.3d 653, 657
(6th Cir. 2005).
166. Id. at 655–56.
167. Id. at 656. In contrast to the typical pre-revision Article 9 cases, which adopted the
reasonably diligent searcher standard, this court, citing federal precedent, applied the “reasonable
and diligent” search test. The difference between these two tests is not readily apparent. The state
law test seems to apply one factor—whether a searcher who is “reasonably diligent” could find the
filing in question. Arguably, the federal test uses two factors—whether a searcher who is both
“reasonable” and “diligent” could locate the disputed record.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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contemplating a loan to a potential debtor will need to search for both
federal tax liens and Article 9 security interests to assure themselves that
the proffered collateral is unencumbered. Arguably then, the search
technique that a creditor will use to find federal tax liens could be readily
employed in the Article 9 records as well. Courts accepting that logic
may be drawn irresistibly back to the “reasonably diligent searcher”
standard even though the new statute rejects it.
D. Cases Resisting the Strict Standard
Two additional post-revision cases illustrate some courts’ inherent
sympathy for the filing creditor in its attempt to get the debtor’s name
right on the financing statement. They reflect a judicial desire to allow
secured parties some degree of fallibility in filling out the financing
statement, even where an error occurs with respect to the debtor’s name.
They may also represent a sub rosa resistance to the strict interpretation
of Revised Article 9’s standard for accuracy in debtors’ names on
financing statements.
1. Fraud claims
In Miller v. Van Dorn Demag Corp. (In re Asheboro Precision
Plastics, Inc.), the bankruptcy court correctly applied the “single search”
standard of Revised Article 9 to invalidate a financing statement that
listed the debtor under its trade name, “Wade Technical Molding, Inc.,”
as opposed to its legal name, “Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc.”170
While acknowledging that a “prudent searcher” would have discovered
the financing statement in question because of certain cross-references
on other financing statements,171 the court held that Revised Article 9
mandated a different result.172 Because a search under the debtor’s legal
name would not have revealed the financing statement in question, it was
invalid.173
But the court then seemingly carved out an exception to the general
rule. The secured creditor argued that because the debtor had

170. Miller v. Van Dorn Demag Corp. (In re Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc.), No. 0311319C-7G, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1091, at *19–25 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2005).
171. Three of the seventeen financing statements filed under the debtor’s legal name also
cross-referenced the trade name, “Wade Technical Molding.” A prudent searcher, the court
suggested, would have looked for financing statements under that name as well. Id. at *24–25.
172. Id. at *25.
173. Id.
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misrepresented its legal name to the creditor, the debtor had committed
fraud.174 The fraud, in turn, caused the creditor to use the incorrect
debtor name on the financing statement, resulting in a lack of perfection
and avoidance by the bankruptcy trustee.175 The fraud, the creditor
asserted, entitled it to a constructive trust on the collateral.176 A
constructive trust would give the secured party an equitable interest in
the collateral and allow it to recover the proceeds from the sale of the
collateral.177 The court held that the trustee was not entitled to summary
judgment on this issue and that the secured creditor should have the
opportunity to prove its fraud claim at trial.178
By recognizing the creditor’s potential claim for fraud and
constructive trust, the court essentially opened the door to reviving the
creditor’s interests that had previously foundered under Article 9
perfection requirements. Bankruptcy courts have been known in the past
to seek to avoid harsh results for secured parties by utilizing equitable
concepts, such as a constructive trust, to remove the collateral from the
bankruptcy trustee’s reach.179 Whether the secured party will succeed
ultimately in establishing its fraudulent misrepresentation claim remains
to be seen. Any secured creditor asserting such a claim may have
difficulty establishing that it reasonably relied on the debtor’s false
statements concerning its legal name. But even the court’s willingness to
entertain fraud/ constructive trust claims reveals perhaps its resistance to
the stricter name standard under new Article 9.

174. According to the secured party, the debtor falsely represented its legal name to be “Wade
Technical Molding, Inc.” when no such entity existed. Id. at *25–26.
175. Id. at *27–28.
176. Id. at *26. Equity courts use constructive trusts “to prevent unjust enrichment to a title
holder of property when the title holder acquired that title through fraud . . . that makes it inequitable
for the title holder to assert a claim to that property against the beneficiary of the constructive trust.”
Id. at *29.
177. The secured party’s “equitable” title to the collateral would trump the trustee’s legal title.
Id. at *34.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Howard’s Appliance Corp. (In re Howard’s Appliance
Corp.), 874 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 1989) (imposing a constructive trust on the collateral in favor of the
secured creditor where the debtor, by secretly relocating the collateral to another state, had caused
the creditor’s security interest to lose its perfection). For a review of the case lawrelating to
constructive trusts in bankruptcy, see generally Robert J. Keach, The Continued Unsettled State of
Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Of Butner, Federal Interests and the Need for Uniformity, 103
COM. L.J. 411 (1998).
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2. Reasonable diligence revisited
In another post-revision case, the court adhered to the “single search”
standard of Revised Article 9 but imposed some duty on searchers to use
reasonable diligence within the confines of that standard.180 In the case
of In re Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc., the secured party had filed a
financing statement correctly listing the debtor as “Randy A. Vincent”
and adding the debtor’s trade name, “Summit Staffing.”181 Thereafter,
the debtor incorporated his business under the name “Summit Staffing of
Polk County, Inc.”182 The secured party did not file an amended
financing statement to reflect the name change.183 In the debtor’s
ensuing bankruptcy, the trustee argued that the creditor’s security interest
was unperfected and therefore avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code’s
“strong arm” clause because the original financing statement had become
seriously misleading following the debtor’s name change.184
In applying Florida’s version of UCC § 9-506(c), the court first
examined whether a search under the debtor’s actual name in the official
Florida database using the filing office’s standard search logic brought
up the secured party’s financing statement.185 The answer to that
question was not as straightforward as the revisers perhaps hoped it
would be. A search under the name “Summit Staffing of Polk County,
Inc.,” the debtor’s current legal name, produced an alphabetical list of
debtor names with twenty names displayed on each computer screen.186
Although the test search did not disclose any exact matches to the
debtor’s current legal name, it did reveal a number of financing
180. In re Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc., 305 B.R. 347, 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
181. Id. at 349.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 349, 351–52 (citing FLA. STAT. § 679.508, which essentially is Florida’s version of
U.C.C. § 9-508 (2001)). Normally, failure to file an amended financing statement reflecting a
seriously misleading debtor name change causes the secured party to lose perfection in collateral
acquired more than four months after the name change. U.C.C. §§ 9-507(c)(2), 9-508(b)(2). Of
course, here the secured party had included a version of the debtor’s new name on its original
financing statement, and thus, arguably, the name change did not render the filed financing statement
seriously misleading.
184. In re Summit Staffing, 305 B.R. at 350, 352–53 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000) and
FLA. STAT. § 679.506 (2002), which is Florida’s version of U.C.C. § 9-506).
185. Id. at 352.
186. Any exact matches to the search request appeared at the top of the list; if there was no
exact match, then the next closest name alphabetically was displayed at the top of the list. Computer
commands appeared on the screen directing the searcher who wished to see additional names to use
the “Previous” or “Next” buttons to move backward or forward alphabetically through the list. Id. at
353–54.
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statements with similar names, including the one filed by the secured
party.187 The court held that the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard
survived the enactment of Revised Article 9, not with respect to the
initial search, but with respect to the actions taken by the searcher in
evaluating the search results.188
The court stated that a searcher must use reasonable diligence in
moving forward and back through the list of names produced by the
computer, using the “Previous” and “Next” keys to scan the list.189 Had
the searcher employed such reasonable diligence, the searcher inevitably
would have seen the secured party’s filing against “Summit Staffing”
with the same address as the successor corporate debtor.190 Thus, the
court held that the secured party’s financing statement was not seriously
misleading.191
A review of the post-revision case lawaddressing the issue of the
debtor’s name on financing statements reveals that many, but not all,
courts are embracing the “single search” standard’s simplicity and
elegance and applying that standard, more or less, as set forth in the
statute. A few courts, however, are seemingly grieving the loss of the
equitable contours of the old standard and are finding ways to save
secured parties whom they perceive to have made relatively small
mistakes in the debtor’s name. For these courts, the “reasonably diligent
searcher” standard is not completely dead.
V. DEFINING THE DEBTOR’S NAME AND REFINING
THE STANDARD SEARCH LOGIC
This Article has identified at least two troublesome debtor name
issues that survive the enactment of Revised Article 9. First, it is unclear,
with the exception of registered organizations, what name should be used
on a financing statement where a debtor has multiple names. An
individual debtor and even an unregistered organization, such as a
general partnership, may have multiple names and, in some cases, even
187. Id. at 353.
188. Id. at 355.
189. See id. at 354–55 (“Certainly the searcher should do this.”).
190. Id. at 355. In this case, there were only three names listed that began with “Summit
Staffing,” and included among them was the secured party’s filing. The court observed, however,
that there were several screens—with twenty names on each screen—with debtors’ names beginning
with “Summit.” The court suggested that the issue of “reasonableness” in the search process
becomes much more difficult where there are dozens of entries to peruse. Id. at 354.
191. Id. at 355.
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multiple “legal” names. Second, the safe harbor provision of UCC § 9506(c)—the “single search” standard for saving faulty financing
statements—is dependent on the breadth and flexibility of the
computerized search logic employed by individual filing offices. As a
result of the uncertainty surrounding multiple-named debtors and varying
filing office search logic, Article 9 loses some of its heralded uniformity
and predictability. In addition, the strictness of the “single search”
standard runs counter to the general pro-secured party stance of Article 9
and thus is inconsistent with one of its overarching policies—to protect
the senior secured party from demotion.
In the following sections, this Article will explore Article 9’s prosecured party flavor in more depth, offer a solution to the problem of
debtors with multiple names, discuss the transition into computerized
filing, and propose the adoption of a more flexible search logic by public
filing offices as a means of enhancing the notice-giving function of the
filing system. Any proposed changes in the law should be evaluated in
terms of whether they advance the time-honored policies behind the
Article 9 scheme and, more generally, whether they promote fairness and
efficiency.
A. Article 9’s Preference for Secured Parties
Article 9 has always, at its core, attempted to make the world good
and true and beautiful for the perfected Article 9 secured party—
especially the senior perfected secured party.192 Under the statutory
scheme, filing is fairly straightforward for secured parties, and indexing
errors within the filing office fall on the shoulders of later searching
parties.193 Post-filing changes in information on the financing statement
require refiling only if significant changes in the debtor’s name occur,194
and then only with respect to a segment of after-acquired collateral.195
192. Scholars have commented that a first-in-time priority scheme, such as that adopted by
Article 9, solves the risk alteration problem experienced by early lenders and encourages creditors to
lend to debtors at an earlier point in time when debtors are more likely to invest in projects with
higher expected returns. See, e.g., Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Politics of Article 9:
Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103, 2113–14 (1994).
193. See U.C.C. § 9-517 (2001) (“The failure of the filing office to index a record correctly
does not affect the effectiveness of the filed record.”).
194. See id. § 9-507(b) (stating that, apart from certain exceptions, “a financing statement is
not rendered ineffective if, after the financing statement is filed, the information on the financing
statement becomes seriously misleading”).
195. If a debtor name-change renders a financing statement seriously misleading, then the
secured party must re-file in the debtor’s new name to avoid loss of perfection in collateral acquired
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The senior perfected secured creditor prevails against most of its
competitors—unsecured creditors,196 lien creditors,197 non-ordinarycourse buyers,198 unperfected secured parties,199 and later perfected
secured parties.200 Even the foreclosure process is designed to be flexible
and efficient for secured parties. Self-help repossession is perfectly
permissible so long as one does not breach the peace,201 and a
foreclosure sale only requires reasonable notice to certain parties202 and
a commercially reasonable disposition.203
Revised Article 9 undoubtedly continues this theme of pampering the
senior perfected secured party and carries it even further. The
information required on a filed financing statement has been stripped
down to the bare minimum,204 and filing in multi-state transactions has
more than four months after the name-change. The original financing statement continues to perfect
the secured party’s security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before the name change or
within four months thereafter. Id. § 9-507(c); see also id. § 9-508 (adopting a similar rule for
transfers of collateral to a new debtor).
196. Id. § 9-201(a) (granting the secured party priority over “creditors”).
197. Id. § 9-317(a)(2).
198. Id. § 9-317(b). A non-ordinary-course buyer would include, for example, someone who
bought a piece of equipment from a widget-manufacturer who did not ordinarily sell equipment. See
id. § 1-201(9) (defining buyer in ordinary course of business). A buyer in ordinary course of
business has priority over even perfected security interests created by their seller. Id. § 9-320(a).
199. Id. § 9-322(a)(2).
200. Id. § 9-322(a)(1).
201. Id. § 9-609(a)–(b). Of course, the scope of what constitutes a breach of peace varies
widely across jurisdictions, and the issue is heavily fact-dependent. See, e.g., Giles v. First Va.
Credit Servs., 560 S.E.2d 557, 563–66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing various case lawstandards
and adopting a five-factor balancing test to determine whether repossession without confrontation
constitutes breach of the peace).
202. See U.C.C. § 9-611 (requiring that “reasonable authenticated notification of disposition”
be sent to the debtor, any secondary obligor, other perfected secured parties, etc.). Revised Article 9
has further simplified the notification process by providing a ten-day safe harbor period for notice
and
supplying
legally
sufficient
notification
forms.
Id.
§§
9-612
to -614.
203. See id. § 9-610(b) (authorizing dispositions “by public or private proceedings, by one or
more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms”).
204. See id. § 9-502(a) (mandating only the debtor’s name, the secured party’s name (or the
name of its representative) and an indication of the collateral on a financing statement). New Article
9, however, does require additional information on the financing statement, such as the party’s
addresses and the debtor’s organizational information, and filing officers are required to refuse
financing statements without this additional information. Id. §§ 9-516(b)(4)–(5), 9-520(a). If, for
some reason, the filing officer accepts and files a financing statement without the additional
information, the filing is effective as long as it contains the three basic elements required by section
9-502(a). Id. § 9-520(c). Even if the additional debtor information is incorrect at the time of filing,
the financing statement is still effective except against certain subsequent parties who reasonably
relied on the incorrect information. Id. § 9-338. Thus, for example, an incorrect debtor address
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been greatly simplified.205 A financing statement unjustifiably refused
by the filing office is still effective, except as against certain reliance
parties.206 New Article 9 creates “partial strict foreclosure” as a further
post-default option for the secured party trying to avoid possible
litigation over what constitutes a commercially reasonable disposition.207
All in all, the world continues to be a fine place for perfected Article 9
secured parties.208
Many of these pro-secured creditor rules are designed to help
security interests stand up against the debtor’s trustee in bankruptcy.
Under the “strong arm clause” of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee has the power to avoid unperfected security interests.209 Thus, the
easier it is for a secured lender to achieve and maintain perfection of its
security interest, the more likely that the creditor will still be able to
enforce the security interest in the event of the debtor’s bankruptcy. With
a valid security interest, a creditor will often be able to satisfy fully the
debt owed to it by seizing and selling the collateral.210 Without a security
interest, the creditor is like all the other general unsecured creditors,

would not invalidate the financing statement unless a subsequent secured party or buyer was misled
by it.
205. Compare U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001) (providing that, generally, the law of the debtor’s
location governs perfection and priority issues), with U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995) (describing complex
choice-of-law rules).
206. See U.C.C. § 9-516(d) (2001) (providing that an improperly rejected financing statement
“is effective as a filed record except as against a purchaser of the collateral which gives value in
reasonable reliance upon the absence of the records from the files”).
207. See id. § 9-620(a) (“[A] secured party may accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction
of the obligation . . . .”); see also Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security Interests
Under Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 923 (1999) (commenting that strict foreclosure
“provides a method of enforcement that is nonadversarial, requires lower transaction costs, and is not
likely to result in litigation”).
208. Congress has seemingly jumped on the secured party’s bandwagon in its recent
amendments to the Federal Bankruptcy Code. The grace periods for perfection have been extended
from ten to thirty days in one instance and from twenty to thirty days in another. See 11 U.S.C. §
547(e)(2)(C)(ii) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (allowing secured parties thirty days from the time of
attachment to perfect their security interests without qualifying as a preference); id. § 547(c)(3)(B)
(providing purchase money secured parties a thirty-day perfection window after the debtor’s
possession of the collateral to qualify for a preference safe harbor). Secured parties now have more
time after signing the security agreement to get to the filing office without fear of having their
security interests avoided as preferences.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
210. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING
251–52 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the secured party’s ability to enforce its security interest in
bankruptcy).
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which take their pro rata share of nonexempt assets211 and often recover
very little in bankruptcy.212
This pro-secured party stance is often justified on the basis that the
secured party has bargained for the privilege of its priority position.213
For example, the secured party will usually have offered a lower interest
rate to the debtor in exchange for the security interest.214 Thus, the
secured party should enjoy the benefits of the security interest unless that
enjoyment would unfairly harm other parties. Avoiding the secured
party’s security interest results in redistribution of the collateral to the
unsecured general creditors. The unsecured creditors normally have
already compensated themselves for their increased risk through higher
interest rates and, in addition, usually do not search the public records
before engaging in a transaction with the debtor.215 Because these
creditors have not bargained for security and do not rely on the public
notice system before lending, it makes no sense to penalize the secured
party for mistakes in perfection.216
Revised Article 9’s new provision regarding debtor names on
financing statements, as discussed, apparently abandons the “reason-ably
diligent searcher” test and imposes the stricter “single search” standard,
which demands an extremely high degree of exactitude in setting forth
the debtor’s name, especially where the debtor is a registered
organization. This new provision, then, is somewhat at odds with Article
9’s overall pro-secured party tenor.217 No longer can the filing creditor
211. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 99 (3d ed. 2001).
212. See NIMMER, supra note 210, at 256 (“[In over] 95% of all consumer bankruptcies
. . . [t]he debtor has no unencumbered, nonexempt assets.”).
213. John C. McCoid II, Bankruptcy, the Avoiding Powers, and Unperfected Security
Interests, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175, 190 (1985).
214. Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1054
(1984).
215. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priority Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147–48 (1979) (discussing the ways in which unsecured creditors
adjust for their risk).
216. See NIMMER, supra note 210, at 287–88 (advocating the priority of unperfected secured
parties over lien creditors, including the trustee in bankruptcy); James J. White, Revising Article 9 To
Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 823, 827 (1993) (“Neither the plumber, carpenter,
accountant, Commonwealth Edison nor any other thousands of general creditors check the files to
determine who has a financing statement on file.”).
217. One, perhaps partially unintended, byproduct of Revised Article 9 is the increased
number of secured transactions that escape filing requirements. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and
Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 455–67 (2005)
(discussing the secret liens potentially created in transactions involving data, intellectual property,
investment property, deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, and letter-of-credit rights).
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commit small errors in the debtor’s name and still achieve perfection
through the substantial compliance standard.
The Article 9 revisers clearly made a policy choice that despite the
statute’s generally pro-secured party slant, precision with respect to the
debtor’s name was essential to maintaining a viable filing system, even if
such precision adds burdens to the filing creditor and sometimes
invalidates financing statements with relatively small errors. Behind that
policy choice was, no doubt, an assessment that any additional burdens
placed on filing creditors were outweighed by the benefits to the filing
system as a whole and, more particularly, to searching parties. In other
words, it is much easier for the filing creditor to get the debtor’s name
right than for searching parties to find a financing statement with an error
in the debtor’s name. The latter task necessitates either trying variant
names or variant spellings of names in the search query (e.g., Erickson,
Ericson, Ericksen, Ericsen) or tendering a broad search inquiry (e.g.,
Smith Auto! for Smith Auto Supplies & Service) and then wading
through a multitude of responses (Smith Auto Body, Smith Automobile
Supply, etc.) to determine whether there is a true match.
Certainly, this implicit cost-benefit analysis is borne out where the
debtor is a registered organization. By consulting the appropriate
Secretary of State registry, a filing party can easily determine the
debtor’s official registered name on the public records of the debtor’s
“home” jurisdiction—i.e., the jurisdiction under the law of which the
debtor is organized. The filing creditor then simply needs to spell that
name correctly on the filed financing statement.218 A few states even
have “point and shoot” computerized systems where a creditor can
transfer the official registered name directly onto a financing statement
or plug the official name into the filing office database to undertake a
search.219
The burden on the filing creditor increases, however, when the
debtor is an unregistered organization (such as a general partnership) or
an individual. Determining the debtor’s “legal” name may be

218. Even though the statute is explicit on what is required for registered organization debtors,
secured parties apparently are having trouble getting the debtor’s name right. An analysis of filings
in Vermont revealed that over half of the financing statements listing registered organization debtors
used names that did not correspond to the officially registered names for those entities. Telephone
Interview with Carl R. Ernst, CEO, Ernst Publishing Co., LLC, in Scottsdale, Ariz. (July 17, 2006).
219. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Spearing Tool Filing System Disaster 12–13 (UCLA School
of Law, Law-Econ Research, Working Paper No. 06-10, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=890312 (describing “point and shoot” systems).
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problematic if the debtor uses a variety of names in different contexts. In
addition, a debtor theoretically could have more than one “legal” or
“correct” name. For example, a partnership may use different names on
its business cards, in its telephone listing, in advertising, on tax returns,
or in registration under an assumed name statute. All of those names may
be different, to a greater or lesser degree, from the name adopted in the
partnership agreement shown to the filing secured party. Furthermore,
the name in that partnership agreement may have been modified by an
amendment not shown to the secured party. Similarly, an individual
debtor may have one name on his or her birth certificate, another on tax
returns, a third on a Social Security card, and a fourth on a driver’s
license.220 Finally, there may be some uncertainty as to who owns
particular property that is offered as collateral—an individual debtor or
some “alter ego” business entity.221 As a result of these factors, the filing
party may not be certain which name should be placed on the financing
statement. Presumably, a searching party will have the same dilemma of
ascertaining which name should be used in a search request.222
220. At common law, an individual’s legal name is “[t]he designation of a person recognized
by the law as correct and sufficient and constituting . . . one given name followed by the family
name and in modern times requiring or permitting one or more middle given names or initials in
abbreviation thereof . . . .” In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758, 761 (N.D. 1976) (quoting WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1290 (1993)). Even the “legal” definition
of legal name theoretically may permit an individual to have more than one legal name. See 625 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/1-137.5 (2005) (defining legal name as the “full given name and surname of an
individual as recorded at birth, recorded at marriage, or deemed as the correct legal name for use in
reporting income by the Social Security Administration”). In addition, it is not entirely clear in some
states whether a married woman is considered to have legally assumed her husband’s name or
whether a divorced woman may resume her birth name without court proceedings. See Jorgensen v.
Larsen, No. 90-4048, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10627, at *11–19 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 1991) (McKay,
J., dissenting) (reviewing various state laws on this issue); see also Carl R. Ernst, How To Adjudicate
a Debtor Name Dispute Under Revised Article 9, NABTALK, Summer 2005, at 32, 34–35
(discussing the problem of debtors with more than one correct name).
221. See, e.g., Bryan Bros. Cattle Co. v. Glenbrook Cattle Co., No. 2:4CV139SAA, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29926, at *16–26 (N.D. Miss. May 1, 2006) (observing that it was somewhat unclear as
to whether the individual debtor or his limited liability company owned particular head of cattle used
as collateral).
222. In an interesting case involving a corporate debtor, the third party searcher argued that he
knew the debtor only by its trade name and not its legal name. In fact, the debtor had used a trade
name on a contract for the purchase of some land from the third party. Panel Town of Dayton, Inc. v.
Corrigan (In re Panel Town of Dayton, Inc.), 338 B.R. 764, 782–83 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006). The
bankruptcy court held that a financing statement filed in the debtor’s legal name was legally
sufficient, notwithstanding the debtor’s frequent use of one or more trade names in its business
dealings with others. Id.; see also In re Nittolo Land Dev. Ass’n, Inc., 333 B.R. 237, 239, 242
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the record was insufficient to determine whether the debtor’s
legal name was “Nittolo Land Development Associates, Inc.,” as it appeared on the secured party’s
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Even where the secured party has ascertained what it believes is the
debtor’s correct legal name, it may still be uncertain as to how to set
forth that name—that is, what is the appropriate spacing, punctuation,
and capitalization of letters. In an example intimately familiar to the
author, “DePaul University” can be found as “Depaul,” “De Paul,” and
“DEPAUL,” depending on where one looks.223 Likewise, a name such as
“Ter Molen” might also be set forth as “TerMolen” or “Termolen.” The
problem becomes exacerbated where non-Anglo names are involved, and
the secured party may be confused as to what constitute the debtor’s first,
last, and middle names.224
Although absolute accuracy in setting forth the debtor’s name on a
financing statement is desirable, placing the burden of ensuring precise
accuracy solely on the filing secured party is arguably neither fair nor
consistent with the overall policy thrust of Article 9. Mistakes inevitably
creep in even where the secured party is attempting to get the debtor’s
name completely correct. The “reasonably diligent searcher” standard

financing statement, or “Nittolo Land Development Association, Inc.,” as it appeared on the debtor’s
bankruptcy petition).
223. The officially adopted name of that particular institution is “DePaul University” or “DE
PAUL UNIVERSITY,” if all uppercase letters are used. DePaul University, Brand Standards,
Writing Guidelines, http://www.depaul.edu/brandmanual/html/writing.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2007).
224. A recent California appellate case illustrates the difficulty of determining the last name of
a debtor with a Latino name. Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d
868 (Ct. App. 2006). In that case, the debtor’s “full true name” was “Armando Munoz Juarez.” Id. at
869. The first secured party filed a financing statement listing his name as “Armando Munoz,”
apparently recognizing that Spanish surnames are formed by listing the father’s surname, then the
mother’s surname. Id. at 869, 871. The second secured party filed a financing statement setting forth
the debtor’s name as “Armando Juarez.” Id. at 869. The court held that the first secured party’s
security interest was unperfected because the debtor’s name was incorrect on the financing statement
and that the financing statement could not be found in the public records searching under the name
“Armando Juarez.” Id. at 870–71. The debtor’s name, stated the court, was “Armando Juarez” or
“Armando Munoz Juarez” for the purposes of the UCC filing. Id. at 871. In support of this
statement, the court observed somewhat cryptically that the “[d]ebtor’s last name did not change
when he crossed the border into the United States.” Id.
Some Asian names can present similar problems. In Chinese names, for example, the first
name (reading left to right) is considered to be the surname or family name. The surname of a person
named “Chen Lu” would be “Chen.” See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R.
10.2.1(g), at 84 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) (commenting that the
surname is given first in Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese); Harvey Stockwin, Vajpayee To Meet
Key Players in China, ECON. TIMES, June 14, 2003 (“[T]he Chinese surname always comes first.”).
Additionally, Arabic names can be transliterated into the Roman alphabet in a number of different
ways. For example, “Said al-Ghamdi” can be properly spelled “Saeed Al Ghamdi” or “Sayeed
Alghamdi,” depending on the method of transliteration employed. AllExperts, Arabic Name:
Encyclopedia, http://experts.about.com/ e/a/ar/Arabic_name.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
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represented a judicial effort to account for the inevitability of such errors
and places at least some of the burden of their existence in the system on
the searching party. Human beings and human systems are fallible, and
those searching such a system should reasonably expect to have to search
as if they were actually trying to find complete information.
The problems with the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard were
evident, however. Searchers could never be sure that they had searched
“diligently enough.” Parties ended up litigating the application of this
standard over and over again because of the fact-dependent nature of the
inquiry. Both equitable and economic efficiency considerations
suggested that it was more appropriate and more efficient for the filing
creditor to get the debtor’s name right in the first place rather than force
the searching party to try an indeterminate number of variations of the
debtor’s name in an attempt to track down the filing party’s financing
statement containing one or more errors.225
On the other hand, Revised Article 9’s adoption of the “single
search” standard does not eliminate all problems, as discussed above.
Filing parties may have difficulty determining the appropriate name to
put on the financing statement where the debtor uses multiple names.
The secured party may reasonably rely on inaccurate information
supplied by the debtor itself in filling out the financing statement.
Miscommunication between the secured party and the debtor or simple
clerical errors may cause mistakes. In a system that attempts to allocate
the burdens of using the filing system fairly and efficiently between the
system’s users, some of these errors may be forgivable, and some may
not be.
Further, because searchers seeking information about non-UCC
liens, such as federal tax liens, are still subject to the reasonably diligent
search standard,226 they will go beyond a single search in the debtor’s
legal name in attempting to find these other liens. One could argue that
there is little (if any) additional effort in transferring whatever kind of
search that they are doing for non-UCC liens into the Article 9 system.

225. The cost of conducting a reasonably diligent search increased enormously over the years,
and by 1995, it was estimated to be more than $25,000 for loans ranging from $20 million to $74
million. See Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 679, 690–91
(1995) (referencing a report submitted to an ABA Task Force on 100 billings by a particular law
firm).
226. United States v. Crestmark Bank (In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.), 412 F.3d 653, 656
(6th Cir. 2005).
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Thus, the question remains whether Article 9 can be further refined
to account for some of these issues. This Article posits two specific
refinements to improve the efficiency and fairness of the filing system:
first, a specific definition as to what constitutes a debtor’s name for filing
purposes, including a safe harbor for filers; and second, a requirement
that state filing offices adopt a uniform, flexible search logic as part of
their electronic filing systems.
B. Defining More Precisely the Debtor’s Name
As discussed above, debtors that are individuals or unregistered
organizations may be using more than one name at the same time.
Theoretically, debtors could even have more than one legal name at any
given time. For example, under common law, a natural person may adopt
any name that he or she wishes, provided that there is no fraudulent or
improper purpose involved.227 Although states now provide statutory
procedures to change one’s legal name for purposes of the public
record,228 most still recognize the common law right to change one’s
legal name “through consistent and continuous use,” again, absent any
deceptive motive.229
To assist both filers and searchers, Article 9 should provide a safe
harbor for selecting a debtor name, just as it creates a safe harbor for
setting forth that name on the financing statement by means of the
“single search” standard. In other words, the statute should specify that
the debtor’s legal name should be used on the financing statement
whether or not the debtor is an individual, a trust, or a registered or
unregistered organization. But, in addition, Article 9 should state that a
secured party who uses the debtor’s name as set forth on a particular
verifiable source should be held to have selected the correct name for use
on a financing statement. The statute already adopts that position for
registered organizations by requiring the debtor’s name as “indicated on

227. See, e.g., Malone v. Sullivan, 605 P.2d 447, 448 (Ariz. 1980); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski,
247 N.W.2d 354, 355 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); In re Miller, 243 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Va. 1978).
228. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-2-101 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-15-101 (2006);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-11 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 68.07 (2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101
(2006); MINN. STAT. § 259.10 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (2006).
229. See, e.g., State v. Hansford, 580 N.W.2d 171, 178–80 (Wis. 1998) (noting that there are
three methods by which one can legally change one’s name: marriage or divorce; court order; and
“consistent and continuous use”).
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the public record of the debtor’s jurisdiction of organization which shows
the debtor to have been organized.”230
The revised statute should list the verifiable sources that will satisfy
the safe harbor. For individual debtors, a filing creditor who uses the
debtor’s name as it appears on the debtor’s most recent federal income
tax return, Social Security card,231 or state-issued identification could be
deemed to comply with the statute even if that name turned out not to be
the debtor’s actual legal name at the time of the filing.232 For
unregistered organizations, the statute could specify that a legally
sufficient debtor name may be drawn from the debtor’s most recent
federal income tax return,233 its most recent organizational agreement,234
or its most recent filing under an assumed name statute.235
Under such a system, searchers would consult the same sources to
determine the debtor’s name for searching purposes. If the potential
debtor has one name on a Social Security card, another on her most
recent tax return, and yet a third on her driver’s license, the searcher
would need to search under all three names to ensure a complete search.
Although searchers would not have a single name under which to search,
as they do for registered organizations, this proposed scheme would
reduce the number of names to be searched to a tolerable minimum.

230. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1) (2001).
231. One commentator writing on a UCC listserv has suggested a filing system organized by
debtor Social Security numbers (“SSNs”). Posting of Lynn LoPucki to ucclaw-l
-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (Sept. 30, 2006, 12:03 p.m.) (on file with author). Unlike names, SSNs
are presumably unique for each person and therefore completely reliable as identifiers. See id. To
surmount privacy objections, he has urged redaction of the SSNs so that they would not be visible in
the system but could be used internally as part of a search. See id. In response to the listserv post,
others objected that sometimes individuals have more than one SSN, the IRS will not verify an SSN,
and privacy concerns remain if an individual’s SSN is required on a publicly filed document even if
it is redacted in search requests. See, e.g., Posting of George A. Hisert to ucclaw-lbounces@lists.washlaw.edu (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author).
232. For example, suppose the debtor filed her 2006 federal income tax return on April 15,
2007, under the name Mary P. Anderson. In August 2007, the debtor marries, assumes her husband’s
surname, and becomes known as Mary A. Jones. In late August, the debtor applies for a secured loan
under the name Mary P. Anderson. The debtor fails to inform the creditor of her marital status or her
new name. If the creditor uses the name on her 2006 tax return, the creditor, under this proposal,
would have made a legally effective filing.
233. All partnerships, whether or not they have tax liability, must file a federal income tax
return for every taxable year. 26 U.S.C. § 6031 (2001).
234. See, e.g., In re Waters, 90 B.R. 946, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (“[T]he legal name of
a partnership is the name designated by a general partnership agreement, where one exists.”).
235. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1 (2006) (requiring filing in the county in order to
conduct business under an assumed name); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-68 (2006) (requiring the same).
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Defining the debtor’s name more precisely in Article 9 would serve
the policies behind Article 9 as a whole and, more particularly, the
policies that inform the filing system. Article 9, at its core, protects
secured creditors. In addition, the filing system is designed to allow
earlier parties to communicate with later parties about the possible
existence of security interests. That system, as mentioned above, should
be constructed to allocate the burdens of its use equitably and efficiently.
By defining what constitutes a legally sufficient debtor name for filing
purposes, the system would reduce the number of choices—ex ante and
ex post—that parties using the system must make with reference to the
debtor’s name. That reduction of choices saves labor on the part of both
filers and searchers, and in an uncertain world, evenly allocates the
burden of figuring out the debtor’s name. Finally, this proposal protects
secured parties by creating a safe harbor that allows them to enjoy some
assurance that they have selected, in fact, the debtor’s correct legal name.
C. The Transition to Computerized Filing
Defining more specifically the debtor’s name for use on a financing
statement will certainly increase the filing system’s certainty and
efficiency. But that step alone does not completely solve the problem of
errors in public records. As will be discussed, the fundamental change in
how filing records are created and maintained during the modern era has
affected the ability of searchers to retrieve information. Following an
overview of the historical development of the filing system, this Article
will explore a potential solution to the problem of data access that
involves creation and adoption of a search logic more flexible than those
currently in use.
The “reasonably diligent searcher” standard espoused by the prerevision case law developed under a largely non-computerized filing
system. Filing creditors submitted paper copies of their financing
statements to filing office clerks for indexing in the public records.
Searching parties would go through the public index manually or would
submit a request on a call slip to the clerk, who would then conduct the
search on the searching party’s behalf.
As states began to computerize their UCC files,236 the filer’s
situation remained largely the same. In addition to using paper forms,
236. As of April 1995, thirty-seven states were employing some sort of computerized filing
system and four more were in the process of adopting such a system. See Edward S. Adams et al., A
Revised Filing System: Recommendations and Innovations, 79 MINN. L. REV. 877, 889–90 (1995).
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filing creditors gained the option of filling out their forms on a computer
and submitting them for filing electronically. Whether the filer typed the
debtor’s name onto a paper form or an electronic one, the burden of
getting the debtor’s name correct was more or less the same. Computers
neither helped nor hindered this process.237
For searchers, however, the world changed and continues to change.
Rather than riffling through index cards or submitting a search request to
a clerk on a slip of paper, the searching party now has the ability to enter
a search term on the Secretary of State’s official website and receive a
computerized response within seconds. The filing office’s “search logic,”
rather than a human being, runs the search.238 Accordingly, the searcher
is no longer dependent on the judgment, skill, and work ethic of a
particular agent or clerk in determining whether or not filings against a
specific debtor exist in the public record. The filing office’s computer, in
conducting a search, presumably does not exhibit the variations in dayto-day performance that humans do and, consequently, does not make the
same mistakes in searching.
Thus, in some sense, the advent of the computer would seem to
render the searching process more reliable and less subject to human
error. However, courts quickly recognized the limitations of electronic
searching.239 Depending on the parameters and, particularly, the
flexibility of the database’s search logic, a search request might reveal
financing statements that contained certain types of errors in the debtor’s
name but might not reveal financing statements with other types of
errors. For example, in the mid-1990s, a search request in the Texas
Secretary of State’s office under the name “Kaldor-Hicks Construction

237. Even a computer program with a “spell check” feature will be of marginal use to a
creditor in setting forth the name of a debtor, whether it is an individual or organization. Most “spell
check” programs focus on English language words and some common names, such as “Jones,”
“Smith,” “Gomez,” etc. Certainly, a “spell check” feature might be helpful in alerting a creditor that
it had misspelled “Smith” as “Smitt.” But, it would not flag variant spellings of names—e.g.,
Woodard vs. Woodward, Braun vs. Brown, Livingston vs. Livingstone. Additionally, it would tag as
misspelled certain foreign or unusual names not in the program’s database—e.g., Verreos,
Yamaguchi, Krimitsou.
238. It may be inferred, however, that in systems where the searcher does not have direct
access to the official database, a clerk may enter the search request into the system on the searcher’s
behalf. See Kathy Berg, Revised UCC Article 9: Utah “Filing Office” Update, 15 UTAH B.J., Apr.
2002, at 14, 16 (“We only search what we are given.”).
239. See, e.g., In re Waters, 90 B.R. 946, 960 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (“Admittedly, a
computer search [as opposed to a file box search] may require more precision in requesting a name
search. The entry of a single name into the computer system may retrieve only a listing of financing
statements on which the name is identical to the name entered.”).
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Co.” would reveal a financing statement listing the debtor as “Kaldor
Hicks Construction Co.” but would not reveal a financing statement
listing the debtor as “Kaldorhicks Construction Co.”240
Some courts have reacted to the strictures of the computerized
system with a “that’s life” attitude.241 Limitations in the search logic
simply increase the burden on the filing creditor to get the debtor’s name
right in the first place. Although this rule might produce harsh results for
the filing secured creditor in some cases, it honors the notice-giving
purpose of the filing system.242
Other courts have regarded the advent of computerized searching
with less equanimity. One bankruptcy judge held that searchers using
electronic methods are still charged with finding all financing statements
that a manual searcher would find under the old system.243 Otherwise,
people would become “servants” to their machines: “If computers
frustrate rather than fulfill this essential purpose [of enhancing
productivity and efficiency], humans inevitably must either discard them
or limit their function.”244
D. Potential Solutions that Computers Offer
Presumably, there is not much that computers can do to help the
filing creditor with the first issue discussed—that of deciding which
name to use on the financing statement where a debtor seemingly has
multiple names. Computers and their corresponding data management
techniques can assist, however, in resolving the second issue—how to
assist secured parties in setting forth the debtor’s name. Revised Article 9
requires the appropriate state agency to adopt filing office rules
“consistent with this article.”245 Most states have adopted the model

240. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Bank of the West, 166 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 1999)
(explaining the computer search logic in the Texas Secretary of State’s office).
241. See Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 891 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 2006) (observing that a restricted search logic does not relieve the filing creditor of the
burden of getting the debtor’s correct name on the financing statement nor does it impose on
searchers the duty to search under possible variations of the debtor’s name).
242. ITT Commercial, 166 F.3d at 304.
243. See In re Mines Tire Co., 194 B.R. 23, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (“To the extent that a
human searcher would inevitably examine all corporate names having certain basic components, a
computer searcher should act similarly. It will not suffice to perform a word search for the precise
corporate name. Rather, the interested party should expand its investigation to include all related
entries through which a manual searcher might have stumbled.”).
244. Id. at 25.
245. U.C.C. § 9-526(a)(1) (2001).
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standard search logic promulgated by the International Association of
Commercial Administrators (IACA).246 Under the model standard search
logic, the computer records the data present on filed documents in a
particular way, processes data on search requests according to the same
rules, and then retrieves exact matches. For example, it ignores spaces247
and records all characters as a single case (either upper or lower,
depending on how the computer is programmed).248 The phrase “Net
work Solutions” on a filed financing statement would be recorded in the
database,
if upper case is the standard case, as “NETWORKSOLUTIONS.”
A search under the name “Network Solutions” would reveal
the financing statement described above. The computer would
convert the search request to the string of characters
“NETWORKSOLUTIONS,” again removing all spaces and reading all
characters as upper case. In this example, therefore, the electronic search
mechanism would reveal a financing statement for this debtor, despite
any errors in spacing, capitalization, or punctuation.249 A searcher would
see this financing statement and then presumably be able to conclude,
based on the debtor address recorded, that the debtor listed on the
financing statement was indeed the correct party.
Unquestionably, the extent of the search results produced by a single
search under the debtor’s legal name is tied to the flexibility of the filing
office’s standard search logic, and a restrictive search logic will generate
fewer results than a more flexible one. Arguably, the non-standardized
search methodologies maintained by many states during the transition
period between old and new Article 9 can provide a model by which the
filing office could fashion a more responsive standardized search
246. In fact, under new Article 9, the designated state rulemaking agency must “consult the
most recent version of the Model Rules promulgated by the International Association of Corporate
Administrators” in creating filing office rules. Id. § 9-526(b)(2). IACA is “a professional
organization of government administrators of business organization and secured transaction record
systems at the state, provincial, territorial, and national level in any jurisdiction which has or
anticipates development of such systems.” Int’l Ass’n of Commercial Adm’rs, About IACA,
http://www.iaca.org/node/12 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). IACA promulgates an Article 9 standard
search logic and model forms, which many, but not all, states have adopted.
247. See, e.g., CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 2, § 22601.4(f) (2006) (following the IACA Model
Rules).
248. Id. § 22601.4(b).
249. In the actual case upon which this hypothetical is based, the filing office’s standard
search logic did not retrieve a financing statement with the debtor’s name listed as “Net work
Solutions, Inc.” when the search term “Network Solutions, Inc.” was entered. Receivables
Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC, 588 S.E.2d 831, 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
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methodology. During the transition period, several states have offered
searchers two options for Article 9 searches—one for standardized
searches and one for non-standardized searches.250 The standardized
search is one conducted according to the filing office’s standard search
logic in the official state UCC database. The non-standardized search is
usually one conducted under a more flexible search methodology in the
official state UCC database.251 States have been affording searchers the
option of performing a non-standardized search during the transition
period so that they can locate financing statements filed in accordance
with pre-revision Article 9.252 These financing statements, by and large,
remained effective during the transition period,253 which ended in most
states on June 30, 2006.254
Test searches under the non-standardized methodology tended to
reveal more financing statements than those performed according to the
standard search logic. For example, assume a partnership with an official
name of “Walker and Hunt Log” granted a security interest in its
inventory and accounts to a bank. Also assume that the bank filed the
financing statement against the debtor under the incorrect name “Walker
and Hunt Log and Lumber,” based on some partnership documents
presented by the debtor that were subsequently amended. Subsequently,
if a prospective lender does a standardized search in the official state
database under the debtor’s current name, “Walker and Hunt Log,” the
standard search logic will not reveal the earlier financing statement. A
non-standardized search under that name, however, will produce a match
250. Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 300 B.R. 47, 51–52 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003),
rev’d, 308 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (describing the unofficial and official search methods
available in Kansas).
251. See Berg, supra note 238, at 16 (noting that an official certified search is more restricted
and less rapid than the unofficial flexible online search mechanism).
252. See, e.g., Kentucky Secretary of State, Business Services, Revised Article 9 UCC NonStandard Search, http://apps.sos.ky.gov/business/ucc/(l1n4z045zfwimdiecsltlt55)/ searchnstd.aspx
(last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (referring searchers to the non-standard search page for filings made
before June 29, 2001); Maine Department of the Secretary of State, Debtor Name Index Search,
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/corp/debtor_index.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (allowing
searchers to use a wildcard character to retrieve debtor name variations in an “unofficial” search).
253. See U.C.C. § 9-705(c) (2001) (providing that financing statements satisfying the
applicable requirements for perfection under former Article 9 remain effective until the earlier of
“the time the financing statement would have ceased to be effective under the law of the jurisdiction
in which it is filed; or . . . June 30, 2006”).
254. In three states, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, the transition period ends December
31, 2006. See ALA. CODE § 7-9A-705 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 679.705 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 759-705 (2006). In Arizona, the transition period ends June 30, 2007. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479705 (2006).
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with the earlier financing statement because of the additional flexibility
of the computerized search parameters.255
Similarly, the design of the search page on the Secretary of State’s
website could assist searchers in discovering existing financing
statements that may contain errors in the debtor’s name. For example,
one state UCC website prompts the searcher to begin a search with the
first word of an organizational name.256 The searcher then has the option
to put in additional words from the name on separate lines in the search
request. This approach, of course, encourages searchers to pull up all
financing statements that have debtor names containing that initial word.
For instance, a search under “Bates” will reveal financing statements
against Bates Auto Supply, Bates Soil & Water Testing Service, Bates
Holdings, and so forth.257 Depending on the size of the jurisdiction
involved and the commonness of the name, the searcher could have a
relatively manageable number of “hits” to sort through. In addition, the
use of root words in searches could aid in recovering financing
statements with certain errors in the debtor’s name. The search
mechanism could be programmed to pull up all words containing the root
word—e.g., a search under “Auto” would reveal “Auto,” “Automobile,”
“Automotive,” “Automatic,” and so forth.
In the end, one might posit that the computer, which has improved
the efficiency of so many of the tasks of modern life, could assist in
solving the debtor name problem. A properly engineered electronic filing
system conceivably could blend the “reasonably diligent searcher” and
“single search” standards. As under Revised Article 9, a searcher could
assure itself of having adequately searched by performing a single
search. The input and output of that single search, however, could reveal
financing statements that contain certain errors in the debtor’s name—in
other words, financing statements that would have been discovered by a
reasonably diligent searcher operating under the pre-revision approach.
Once having seen those financing statements, the searcher could

255. This hypothetical is based on test searches conducted on July 21, 2006, in the Kentucky
Secretary of State online databases for UCC filings, which are located at
http://apps.sos.ky.gov/business/ucc (on file with author).
256. See Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions, UCC Filing Search, Search for
Organization Name, http://www.wdfi.org/ucc/search/default.asp?searchType=organization (last
visited Feb. 8, 2007).
257. This hypothetical is based on test searches conducted on July 23, 2006, in the Wisconsin
Secretary of State online database for UCC filings, which is located at
http://www.wdfi.org/ucc/search/default.asp?searchType=organization (on file with author).
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determine relatively quickly whether or not any of those statements
pertain to the individual or entity that is the subject of the search.
Such an electronic searchable database might include several specific
features, some of which have already been described: a flexible search
logic, a suitable list of noise words, and a search page that directs
searchers to conduct their searches using initial words, root words, and/or
wildcard characters. Developing this kind of system may not even
necessitate creating an entirely new scheme; there are features of existing
systems that could be employed or modified to create an even more
sophisticated database. Upfront investment to refine the electronic filing
system could be more than offset, one might hope, by efficiencies
enjoyed by filers and searchers alike.
Article 9, following in the steps of its statutory predecessors,
mandates that secured creditors file in a publicly created recordkeeping
system. If filers and searchers could talk directly to one another, they
would not need the intermediary of the legislatively spawned filing
system.258 In keeping with its role of serving the public interest, the
filing office should be required to develop a filing and searching system
that reduces costs for parties forced to use that system. Such a system
could go a long way toward fulfilling the goals of an ideal notice-giving
mechanism: accommodating (to some extent) the inevitable failures of
filers, allowing searchers to retrieve efficiently and accurately the
information that they need, and reducing the amount of litigation
surrounding financing statement adequacy.259
VI. CONCLUSION
For as long as public recording systems have existed, efficiency
concerns have surrounded them—how to ensure that those using these
systems are able to record and extract the appropriate information in the

258. In the best of all possible worlds, the information-seeking party would simply ask the
debtor whether there were any prior security interests in particular collateral, and the debtor would
respond truthfully and accurately that there were or were not. If there were prior interests, the debtor
would then supply the name and contact information of the earlier creditor, whom the later party
could contact directly for more information about the security interest.
259. The Article 9 Study Group, which began the revision process with its 1992 report,
specifically noted the prevalence of “inadequate computer systems (both hardware and software) and
insufficient staffing” in state filing offices. See UCC REPORT, supra note 7, at 88. It urged adoption
of “minimum performance standards . . . to determine whether a system is functioning satisfactorily”
and observed that the systemic problems of filing offices “cannot be solved through refinements to
the text of Article 9.” Id. at 88–89.
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most cost-effective way.260 The Article 9 filing scheme, as a public
recording system, has not escaped those concerns. Because the gateway
to the Article 9 filing records has always been and continues to be the
debtor’s name, the analysis of the system’s efficiency has focused on that
particular element of a financing statement. Under former Article 9, the
burdens of using the system were borne more heavily by searchers. Filers
were required to get fairly close to the debtor’s actual name on the
financing statement, but searchers had a duty to execute a reasonably
diligent search to retrieve the financing statement. The revisers of Article
9 consciously shifted more of the burden of system use to filers with
adoption of the “single search” standard of UCC § 9-506(c). Under this
standard, secured creditors must get the debtor’s name almost perfect on
the financing statement to achieve perfection and to avoid complete loss
of their security interests in bankruptcy.
The “reasonably diligent searcher” standard was rightly criticized: it
unduly burdened searchers and it created problematic litigation in which
each case had to be addressed freshly based on its idiosyncratic facts. But
the “single search” standard of Revised Article 9 has seemingly created
its own set of problems: it may be viewed as unfairly harsh toward filing
creditors, it appears to have generated a fair of amount of litigation, and
it cuts against the general pro-secured party thrust of Article 9.
Moreover, because the new rule is tied to the standard search logic of
individual states, the uniformity that Article 9 has long sought to promote
is diminished.
Accordingly, this Article has suggested that the “single search” rule
may have swung the pendulum too far in the other direction. In some
cases, courts have resisted it by finding an escape hatch for the filing
secured party through application of constructive trust principles or
resurrection of the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard for at least a
portion of the search. In other cases, the courts have invalidated
financing statements with minute errors in spacing or punctuation.
Additionally, the full impact of the new standard has yet to be felt as the
transition period between old and new Article 9 has just recently ended.
In an effort to assist both filers and searchers attempting to use the
Article 9 recording scheme, this Article has argued for two additional
modifications of Article 9. First, the statute should be amended to clarify

260. See George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of the Recording System in Massachusetts, 21
B.U. L. REV. 281, 284–88 (1941) (describing land recording systems in the early- to mid-1600s in
Massachusetts and other colonies).
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that secured parties must use the debtor’s legal name on the financing
statement and to create a safe harbor for secured parties in attempting to
ascertain the debtor’s legal name. Second, Article 9 should require
further refinement of the electronic filing systems maintained by filing
officers in the various states. Implementation of a standard flexible
search logic coupled with instructions on how most effectively to search
the database, it is hoped, will serve both equity and efficiency goals. The
proposed changes will afford filers the peace of mind of knowing that
some degree of fallibility will be tolerated and will offer searchers the
simplicity of conducting a “single search” while retrieving the
information of a “reasonably diligent” one.
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